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You receive a call one day from a local judge, asking you to take a case that,
the judge assures you, will not take up much of your time. The judge wants
you to represent a man who has been arrested on a charge of possession of
marijuana; there is nothing special about the case, the judge tells you, but the
local public defender organization is unable to represent the man due to a
conflict, and he has no money to hire an attorney. You agree to represent him,
thinking that the case could not be too complex and, when you receive the
discovery from the prosecution, it seems to be open-and-shut. Two police
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officers saw your new client smoking marijuana behind a shopping mall and
arrested him. You know that the maximum penalty for a first-time offender—
like your client—is sixty days in jail, and the judge to whom the case is
assigned invariably gives first-time marijuana offenders a small fine and
thirty days of probation.
When you meet your client, he tells you that he wants to put this case behind
him as quickly as possible. As you begin to explain to him his options, he
immediately tells you that he wants to plead guilty. He goes on to say to you
that he knows that he must plead guilty because he saw devils in the courtroom
when he was arraigned, and the devils told him that they would torture him if
he went to trial. In describing this, your client begins to cry and insists that
you arrange for him to plead guilty as soon as possible.
Not only do you know the relatively light consequences to your client if he
pleads guilty to this charge, you also know the consequences of raising with the
court doubts about your client’s competency. The law in your state requires the
judge to order a competency evaluation if there exists a reasonable possibility
that a defendant is not competent to stand trial, and such evaluations are
done at the state mental hospital, on an in-patient basis. If you raise the issue
of competency, then you are certain that your client will be held at the state
mental hospital for at least sixty days while the evaluation is completed,
possibly longer. If your client is ultimately found incompetent, the law allows
that he may be civilly committed to an indefinite period of confinement at the
state mental hospital. You also remember learning in your professional
responsibility class in law school that all lawyers are officers of the court and,
as such, have an obligation of candor to the court and some responsibility to
maintain the integrity of the legal system.
What do you do? Do you tell the court, heedless of the consequences to your
client, that you believe your client is delusional and not competent to proceed?
Do you keep your doubts to yourself and your fingers crossed that your client
makes it through a guilty plea without talking about the devils that visit him?
Now assume that, instead of insisting on a guilty plea, your client insists on a
trial. Who decides on your theory of defense? Which witnesses to call?
Whether to try your case to a jury or to a judge? Where do you turn for
guidance? Do you do what your mentally impaired client tells you to do?
What you think he would want if not for his mental illness? What you think
is best for him? Can you be both a zealous advocate and an officer of the
court? Of course, you are wondering why you ever agreed to take this case.
INTRODUCTION
If there is one foundational principle of legal ethics about which
scholars, practitioners, and the public might agree, it is that a lawyer
should do no harm to her client. Upon examination, however, this
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principle turns out to be shakier than it first appears. On some
occasions, rules of ethics may force the lawyer to do just that. The
obligations of acting as a zealous advocate for one’s client and as an
officer of the court do at times conflict, and that tension is most
1
acutely felt in the case of the criminal defense lawyer. The criminal
defense lawyer’s role as zealous partisan occupies a position unique
in the legal profession. The duty of the criminal defense lawyer
toward her client has been called “one of singular devotion; the
2
lawyer is devoted to the client and the client only.” The United
States Supreme Court eloquently articulated the unique role of the
defense lawyer within the adversarial system: “[A] defense lawyer best
serves the public, not by acting on behalf of the State or in concert
with it, but rather by advancing ‘the undivided interests of his
3
4
client.’” Given this uniquely partisan role, in what sense is the
defense lawyer an “officer of the court”? This uneasy positioning of
the defense lawyer leads to difficult ethical decisions; in no situation
is the tension more pronounced than in the context of representing
a client who is mentally impaired.
Every criminal defendant has an absolute right to control certain
aspects of her case. Decisions regarding whether to go to trial or
enter a guilty plea, whether to testify, and whether to have her case
decided by a judge or a jury ultimately belong exclusively to the
5
defendant. According to traditional legal ethics, while the defendant
1. See Deborah Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589,
605 (1985) (stating that the criminal defense context is that in which “the case for
undiluted partisanship is most compelling”).
2. Abbe Smith, The Bounds of Zeal in Criminal Defense: Some Thoughts on Lynne
Stewart, 44 S. TEX. L. REV. 31, 42 (2002). Smith also calls it a “sacred duty.” Id. In
support of this view of the lawyer-client relationship, Smith cites the work of Charles
P. Curtis regarding legal ethics. Curtis described his view succinctly: “[The lawyer’s]
loyalty runs to his client. He has no other master.” Id. at 42 n.91 (citing Charles P.
Curtis, The Ethics of Advocacy, 4 STAN. L. REV. 3, 3 (1951–1952)).
3. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318 (1981) (Powell, J.).
4. Justice Powell’s understanding of the unique role of the defense lawyer is not
universally shared. In Nix v. Whiteside, Chief Justice Burger opined that the defense
lawyer’s responsibilities and duties as an officer of the court are “equally solemn” as
the defense lawyer’s duty to advocate for her client. 475 U.S. 157, 168 (1986). Chief
Justice Burger, like many judges, tended to privilege the lawyer’s role as an officer of
the court above the lawyer’s role as advocate or partisan. See, e.g., In re Griffiths, 413
U.S. 717, 732 (1973) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“The role of a lawyer as an officer of
the court predates the Constitution; it was carried over from the English system and
became firmly embedded in our tradition. It included the obligation of first duty to
client. But that duty never was and is not today an absolute or unqualified duty.”).
5. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2002) (setting forth the
general framework within which decisions are to be made during the scope of
representation). That rule provides that:
[A] lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of
representation . . . and shall consult with the client as to the means by which
they are to be pursued . . . . In a criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the
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controls these core aspects of the litigation, the lawyer controls the
6
strategic decisions. Whether to call certain witnesses, for example,
and whether and how to cross-examine the government’s witnesses
7
are traditionally considered to rest with the discretion of the lawyer.
These very general rules, however, are of limited utility to a defense
lawyer who finds herself in disagreement with her client and caught
in a dilemma between respecting her client’s right to autonomous
decision-making and her own desire to serve the best interests of her
client.
A criminal defense lawyer who believes in a client-centered model
8
of representation must necessarily accept that she will at times take
actions that will be harmful to her client. The competent, rational
client has a right to make decisions that are counter-productive,
9
harmful, and even disastrous.
The client-centered lawyer must
client’s decision, after consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be
entered, whether to waive jury trial and whether the client will testify.
Id. The allocation of decisional power set forth in Rule 1.2(a) is, at least in the first
instance, universally accepted and uncontroversial. A precise delineation between
“objectives” and “tactics,” however, can be elusive in practice. See DAVID BINDER &
SUSAN PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH
192 (1977) (emphasizing that client-centered decision-making is not always possible,
for example, because of clients who are indecisive, or insist on following the lawyer’s
opinion, or insist on their own opinion regardless of the lawyer’s advice).
6. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 2 (2002) (explaining that,
when in disagreement, clients will normally defer to their lawyer with respect to
“tactical” matters).
7. Id.
8. For a nuanced description of the history and theoretical underpinnings of
client-centered lawyering, see Katherine R. Kruse, Fortress in the Sand: The Plural
Values of Client-Centered Representation, 12 CLINICAL L. REV. 369 (2006). Rodney Uphoff
contrasts client-centered lawyering with the traditional lawyer-centered approach by
locating the focus of ultimate decision-making power. Rodney J. Uphoff, Who Should
Control the Decision To Call a Witness: Respecting a Criminal Defendant’s Tactical Choices,
68 U. CIN. L. REV. 763 (2000). Client-centered lawyering, he writes:
[A]ssumes that clients often are in a better position to make case decisions
because so many decisions actually turn on the client’s values and priorities
that the client alone best appreciates. The lawyer’s role in this model, then,
is to provide clients with meaningful information so as to empower clients to
make informed choices about their cases.
Id. at 769; see also BINDER & PRICE, supra note 5, at 143 (“[T]he responsibility for
identifying the probable legal consequences of any particular alternative must rest
with the lawyer.”); Stephen Ellman, Lawyers and Clients, 34 UCLA L. REV. 717, 728
(1987) (emphasizing the importance of client decision-making over unruly power
and manipulation a lawyer often has over her client’s case); Monroe H. Freedman,
Ethical Ends and Ethical Means, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 55, 55–56 (1991) (“I think of
lawyers’ ethics as rooted in the Bill of Rights as expressed in our constitutionalized
adversary system.
My view of lawyers’ ethics is, therefore, client-centered,
emphasizing the lawyer’s role in enhancing the client’s autonomy as a free person in
a free society.”).
9. What of the rational, competent client who freely chooses to forego her only
viable defense? A classic example is the story of “The Long Black Veil,” a country
ballad about a man who chooses to be executed for a crime he did not commit
rather than to reveal his alibi. The song was originally recorded by Lefty Frizzell in
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accept that her role is to assist her rational, competent client in
achieving the client’s goals, even if those goals are not what the
lawyer would have chosen. Taken to its extreme, however, a model of
absolute client-centered decision-making can devolve into an
abdication of responsibility on the part of the defense lawyer. In
cases involving criminal defendants suffering serious mental
impairment, the very reasoning behind the model of client-centered
10
representation and client autonomy can fall apart, especially in cases
involving defendants who, although competent to stand trial, are
11
“decisionally incompetent” and, therefore, unable meaningfully to
assist in their own defenses.
A significant number of prisoners in state and federal jails and
12
prison suffer from some form of severe mental illness. Today, two of
the nation’s largest mental health providers are the Los Angeles

1959 and made popular again by Johnny Cash in 1968. The innocent man chooses
to die rather than reveal the truth:
Ten years ago, on a cold dark night
Someone was killed, ‘neath the town hall light
There were few at the scene, but they all agreed
That the slayer who ran, looked a lot like me . . . .
The judge said son, what is your alibi
If you were somewhere else, then you won’t have to die
I spoke not a word, though it meant my life
For I’d been in the arms of my best friend’s wife
JOHNNY CASH, The Long Black Veil, on AT FOLSOM PRISON (Columbia Records 1968)
(lyrics by Marijohn Wilkin and Danny Dill, 1959). David Luban addressed the “Long
Black Veil” situation in terms of legal ethics in his excellent article, Paternalism and the
Legal Profession, 1981 WIS. L. REV. 454, 456. Luban adopts Dennis Thompson’s
definition of paternalism: “‘the imposing of constraints on an individual’s liberty for
the purpose of promoting his or her own good.’” Id. at 461 (citing Dennis
Thompson, Paternalism in Medicine, Law, and Public Policy, in ETHICS TEACHING IN
HIGHER EDUCATION 246 (Daniel Callahan & Sissela Bok eds., 1980)).
10. On the question of autonomy as a motivating principle in the criminal justice
system, see generally Robert E. Toone, The Incoherence of Defendant Autonomy, 83 N.C.
L. REV. 621 (2005). Toone argues that the United States Supreme Court’s reliance
upon autonomy in Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), and the subsequent
constitutional procedural cases misplace defendant autonomy as a constitutional
value. Toone, supra, at 650. Given the constraints under which any criminal
defendant operates, argues Toone, it is meaningless to speak of criminal defendants
as possessing any sort of meaningful “autonomy.” Id. The illusory touchstone of
“defendant autonomy,” according to Toone, should not be allowed to hold sway over
more meaningful principles of the criminal justice system like accuracy, efficiency,
and fairness. Id. at 635.
11. See infra Part II (discussing the distinction between competency to waive
counsel and competency to proceed to trial).
12. DORIS J. JAMES & LAUREN E. GLAZE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MENTAL HEALTH
PROBLEMS
OF
PRISON
AND
JAIL
INMATES
1
(2006),
available
at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/mhppji.pdf. Among all jail inmates, twentyfour percent reported at least one symptom of psychotic disorder, and sixty-four
percent reported some degree of mental health problems. Id.
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13

County Jail and the Cook County (Chicago) Jail. The shift in the
United States from the institutionalization of the mentally ill in
mental hospitals to the incarceration of the mentally ill in jails and
14
prisons has been well-documented. In 1955, the institutionalization
rate of people in mental hospitals was 339 per 100,000; today, the
15
number is fewer than 20 people per 100,000. Where did those vast
16
populations of the mentally ill go? To jails and prisons. As the
institutionalization rate fell over the course of the last fifty years, the
17
While the national
incarceration rate has risen accordingly.
incarceration rate in the mid-1950s was approximately 162 per
100,000, it is currently over 700 per 100,000, nearly a five-fold
18
increase.
13. See Jennifer Fischer, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Correcting Discrimination
of Persons with Mental Disabilities in the Arrest, Post-Arrest, and Pretrial Processes, 23 LAW &
INEQ. 157, 160–61 (2005) (stating that Cook County reported “1,000 out of 11,000
inmates as having a mental illness” and that Los Angeles County Jail houses about
“2,800 persons with a mental illness” giving it the reputation as the “nation’s largest
de facto psychiatric institution”); see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQUIPPED: U.S.
PRISONS AND OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL ILLNESS 16 (2003), http://www.hrw.org/
reports/2003/usa1003/usa1003.pdf (“Jails and prisons have become, in effect, the
country’s front-line mental health providers.”).
14. See, e.g., Darryl K. Brown, Democracy and Decriminalization, 86 TEX. L. REV. 223,
265–68 (2007) (detailing the problems in the criminal justice system with a rising
incarceration rate); Bernard E. Harcourt, From the Asylum to the Prison: Rethinking the
Incarceration Revolution, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1751 (2006) (arguing that mental
hospitalization rates must be aggregated with incarceration rates to accurately reflect
and interpret the rise of the incarceration rate in the United States).
15. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQUIPPED: U.S. PRISONS AND OFFENDERS WITH
MENTAL ILLNESS 19–20 (2003), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/
usa1003/usa1003.pdf (stating that due to lack of funds from the federal and state
government, mental hospitals and community-based mental health services were not
able to adequately provide treatment for the mentally ill, which led to an increase in,
among other things, the incarceration rate).
16. This shift has been described in vivid terms by one commentator: “Over the
past 40 years, the United States dismantled a colossal mental health complex and
rebuilt—bed by bed—an enormous prison.” Bernard E. Harcourt, Op-Ed, The
Mentally Ill, Behind Bars, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2007, at A15.
17. See id. (“[W]e now incarcerate more than two million people—resulting in
the highest incarceration number and rate in the world, five times that of Britain and
12 times that of Japan.”). Indeed, Professor Harcourt points out that the total rate of
institutionalization (including in mental hospitals, asylums, jails, and prisons) is
actually lower today than in the 1940s and 1950s. See id. (explaining that we have
been a culture that institutionalizes people since the 1940s and 1950s, but
emphasizing that people that used to get mental health treatment are now “getting a
one-way ticket to jail”).
18. PAIGE HARRISON & ALAN J. BECK, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISON AND JAIL
INMATES AT MID-YEAR 2005 2 (2006), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/
pub/pdf/pjim05.pdf. Harrison and Beck included prison and jail inmates in both
the federal and state systems and calculated that, as of June 30, 2005, 738 out of every
100,000 people in the United States were incarcerated. Id.; see HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, supra note 15, at 19–20 (noting the incarceration rate in the 1950s); JUSTICE
POLICY INSTITUTE, THE PUNISHING DECADE: PRISON AND JAIL ESTIMATES AT THE
MILLENNIUM 1–2 (2000), available at http://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/
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Against this backdrop, defense lawyers for the indigent are placed
in an untenable situation. As prisons and jails become the new
“treatment” facilities for the nation’s mentally ill, criminal defense
lawyers for the poor are increasingly asked to play various, often19
conflicting roles in the service of their clients and the courts. As
mental illness has become an increasingly prominent and
problematic factor in the representation of indigent criminal
defendants, ethics have not caught up with the realities of day-to-day
20
practice. What is a well-meaning, client-centered defense lawyer to
do when her client is making self-destructive and senseless decisions
not as the result of rational thought, but because of a mental illness
or impairment that prevents the client from making a rational
decision? Before even reaching the questions of the proper
allocation of decisional power within the context of an attorney-client
relationship with a mentally impaired client, the lawyer has a
preliminary determination to make: is the lawyer required to bring
to the court’s attention her concerns regarding her client’s
competency? This Article attempts to provide some guidance
regarding decision-making, allocation of power, and evolving
concepts of autonomy and paternalism in the context of criminal
defense representation.
This Article addresses two related dilemmas facing the criminal
defense lawyer who represents a client who—although arguably
punishing.pdf (charting the rising incarceration rate in the United States over the
course of the twentieth century).
19. See Richard E. Redding, Why It Is Essential To Teach About Mental Health Issues
in Criminal Law (and a Primer on How To Do It), 14 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 407, 407
(2004) (arguing that the changing demographics of criminal defendants require that
we change the way we train criminal defense lawyers).
20. Professor Stanley Herr has complained about the lack of meaningful
guidance that existing ethical codes offer to lawyers attempting conscientiously to
represent mentally impaired clients. Stanley Herr, Representation of Clients with
Disabilities: Issues of Ethics and Control, 17 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 609 (1991).
Professor Herr writes that:
[T]he codes of the organized bar foster confusion about the lawyer’s proper
roles and the scope of the aid lawyers should offer clients. Exacerbated by
the disabled client’s poverty, physical isolation, or unusual legal problems,
this lack of clear ethical guidance may lead some lawyers to shun mentally
disabled clients.
Even worse, such imprecision may contribute to
substandard legal representation and a failure to attend to clients with
mental disabilities.
Id. at 615. Herr criticizes both the Model Code of Professional Responsibility and
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct as providing insufficient guidance to
attorneys struggling with issues of ethical decision-making in their representation of
clients with mental disability. “While sympathetic to the lawyer’s predicament,” he
writes, “the drafters’ suggestion that the lawyer turn to ‘an appropriate diagnostician’
for guidance too narrowly conceives the dilemma. The problem is ethical and not
clinical.” Id. at 620.
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competent to stand trial—has a mental impairment that prevents the
client from making rational decisions about how to proceed with her
case: first, whether to raise with the court her concerns that her
client may be incompetent, and second, how to make strategic
decisions about the case when faced with opposition by a mentally
impaired client.
Part I of the Article examines the historical development of the
concepts of candor, zeal, and the lawyer’s obligation to protect
confidences and secrets in the course of the representation. Part II
addresses some fundamental legal principles surrounding
competency to stand trial and the legal framework within which
competency is assessed and litigated in a criminal case, as well as
some of the critiques of the current legal paradigm of competency.
Part III discusses the ethical rules guiding defense counsel in
representing a mentally impaired client, and examines the
shortcomings of that guidance. Part IV describes two real-life
scenarios encountered by criminal defense lawyers and discusses the
appropriate decision-making strategies that could be used in those
actual examples. Part V argues first that a defense lawyer cannot
ethically raise doubts regarding her client’s competency when doing
so would cause harm to her client, and goes on to propose a new
framework within which a criminal defense lawyer can decide
whether, to what extent, and how she may substitute her own
judgment for that of her mentally impaired client.
Ultimately, this Article argues that the historic role of zeal as a
guiding principle in the ethics of criminal defense requires that the
criminal defense lawyer be endowed with significant discretion in
determining first, whether to raise issues of competency and second,
in how to engage in surrogate decision-making for her mentally
impaired client. This Article rejects the view of some commentators
and courts that the lawyer’s role as officer of the court requires the
21
lawyer to raise doubts about her client’s competency and argues, to
the contrary, that the dignity and moral authority of the criminal
justice system is best served by a defense lawyer being free to operate
solely in the interest of her client.

21. E.g., State v. Johnson, 395 N.W.2d 176, 182 (Wis. 1986) (holding that where
defense counsel has reason to doubt her client’s competency, she is obligated to raise
the issue with the trial court).
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CANDOR, ZEAL, AND CONFIDENTIALITY

Fundamentally, the dilemma faced by the criminal defense lawyer
representing an arguably incompetent client is a dilemma of two
22
conflicting duties: the lawyer’s duty of candor toward the court and
23
the lawyer’s duty of zealous representation. As an officer of the
court, some argue, a lawyer has a responsibility to protect and uphold
the integrity of the process by which the system adjudicates those who
24
come before it. On the other hand, the defense lawyer, more than
any other actor in the criminal justice process, has historically been
seen as appropriately having different goals than the “system”
generally; as a zealous advocate for her client, the defense lawyer
need not concern herself with the search for the truth, or with the
25
reliability of the process.
The duties of candor and zeal, then,
inexorably conflict in the world of criminal defense; the lawyer’s
obligation to protect confidences and secrets learned in the course of
26
the representation adds another dimension to the debate about the
appropriate role of the defense lawyer faced with conflicting duties.
A. A Brief History of Candor
A lawyer’s obligation to “speak the truth” has, at least to some
degree, been a fundamental principle of the legal profession for
27
centuries. Like the concept of zeal, however, the duty of candor is
defined in the details. Lawyers in ancient Rome were required to
swear an oath “to avoid artifice and circumlocution” and “to speak
28
only that which he believes to be true.” By the thirteenth century, at
22. See infra Part I.A (describing the history of an attorney’s duty of candor to the
tribunal).
23. See infra Part I.B (recounting the history of an attorney’s duty of zealous
advocacy).
24. See Gerald F. Uelmen, Lord Brougham’s Bromide: Good Lawyers as Bad Citizens,
30 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 119, 122 (1996–1997) (arguing that the duty lawyers have to their
country and their clients are the same—that is to zealously advocate for their client
within the boundaries set by the law). Uelmen adds that “[t]he premise of the
adversary system is that the goal of fair adjudication is more likely to be served if
lawyers function as zealous advocates for their clients.” Id.
25. See infra note 198 and accompanying text.
26. See infra Part I.C (outlining an attorney’s obligation to not disclose
information communicated by her client in confidence).
27. See Carol Rice Andrews, Standards of Conduct for Lawyers: An 800-Year
Evolution, 57 SMU L. REV. 1385, 1387 (2004) (arguing that six traditional primary
duties of lawyers in medieval England—litigation fairness, competence, loyalty,
confidentiality, reasonable fees, and public service—are still the central duties of
modern lawyers).
28. See id. at 1392–93 (noting that oaths were one of the first methods used to
enforce ethical standards of legal conduct with a central theme of fairness and
honesty) (citing JOSIAH HENRY BENTON, THE LAWYER’S OFFICIAL OATH AND OFFICE 19
(1909) and Joseph Cox, Legal Ethics, 19 WKLY. L. BULL. & OHIO L.J. 47, 49 (1888)).
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least certain English lawyers were subject to discipline for attempts to
29
The thread
present false testimony “or to suppress the truth.”
continues through English legal history; four centuries after the
ecclesiastical oaths described above, Lord Commissioner Whitelocke
30
explained the duties of a seventeenth-century English lawyer. In a
1648 speech to new lawyers, Lord Whitelocke described the three
31
“general” duties of the lawyer: secrecy, diligence, and fidelity. He
went on to discuss in more detail the lawyer’s duty to protect client
32
33
confidences and secrets, to maintain loyalty to the client, and to be
34
candid with the courts.
Many of the American colonies adopted some version of the “do
no falsehood” oaths from England, in which lawyers were required to
swear to some version of a duty of candor toward the tribunal. A
1701 law required all lawyers in the colony of Massachusetts to swear
a typical such oath:
You shall do no falsehood, nor consent to any to be done in the
court, and if you know of any to be done you shall give knowledge
thereof to the Justices of the Court, or some of them, that it may be
According to Cox, the ancient Greek oath contained similar exhortations, requiring
its adherents to “represent the bare truth, without any ornament or figure of
rhetoric, or insinuating means to win the favor or more the affection of the judges.”
Id. at 1393 n.54 (citing Joseph Cox, Legal Ethics, 19 WKLY. L. BULL. & OHIO L.J. 47, 49
(1888)).
29. See Andrews, supra note 27, at 1393 (“The decree also warned that advocates
who . . . ‘suppress the truth’ would be suspended from office and subjected to
additional punishment for repeated violations.”).
30. Id. at 1400–01.
31. See id. (citing WHITELOCKE’S MEMORIALS 352 (1732)) (noting that lawyers
were not only subject to formal standards, but also oaths and academic speeches that
contributed to the meaning of their duties as advocates to their community). Lord
Whitelocke was addressing a group of men who were becoming “serjeants,”
considered to be the elite of the English legal profession, trained in common law and
pleading. See id. at 1391–92 (noting that serjeants often represented the king and
were considered the best of the profession). Lord Whitelocke’s three basic duties of
a serjeant—secrecy, diligence, and fidelity—have been referred to as “the pegs for an
exposition of the central rules of professional responsibility.” ROSS CRANSTON, LEGAL
ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 6 (1995).
32. See Andrews, supra note 27, at 1400 n.117 (“For secrecy: advocates are a king
of confessors, and ought to be such, to whom the client may with confidence lay
open his evidences, and the naked truth of his case, sub sigillo, and he ought not to
discover them to his client’s prejudice; nor will the law compel him to it.” (quoting
WHITELOCKE’S MEMORIALS 355 (1732))).
33. See id. at 1400 n.119 (“For fidelity: it is accounted vinculum societatis. The
name of unfaithfulness is hateful in all; and more in advocates than others, whom
the client trusts with his livelihood, without which his life is irksome; and the
unfaithfulness or fraud of the one is the ruin of the other.” (quoting WHITELOCKE’S
MEMORIALS 355 (1732))).
34. See id. at 1400 n.116 (“An advocate owes to the court a just and true
information. The zeal of his client’s cause, as it must not transport him to
irreverence, so it must not mislead him to untruths in his information of the court.”
(quoting WHITELOCKE’S MEMORIALS 355 (1732))).
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reformed. You shall not wittingly and willingly promote, sue or
procure to be sued any false or unlawful suit, nor give aid or
consent to the same. You shall delay no man for lucre or malice,
but you shall use yourself in the office of an attorney within the
court according to the best of your learning and discretion, and
with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to your clients. So help
35
you God.

Codes of conduct and lawyers’ oaths in pre-Revolutionary and early
America did not stress the duty of zeal or confidentiality to the extent
36
that earlier English precedent had.
Rule 3.3 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“Model
Rules”) sets forth a modern articulation of the lawyer’s duty of
37
candor toward the tribunal. Rule 3.3 would impose upon lawyers a
broad obligation of disclosure toward the court that will inevitably
35. Id. at 1415 n.206 (citing HORRIS R. BAILEY, ATTORNEYS AND THEIR ADMISSION
(1907)).
36. Id. at 1422–23 (noting the duty of confidentiality did not appear in colonial
and early American regulations regarding lawyers’ conduct).
37. Rule 3.3 directs:
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal or fail to
correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the
tribunal by the lawyer;
(2) fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling
jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of
the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel; or
(3) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer, the
lawyer’s client, or a witness called by the lawyer, has offered material
evidence and the lawyer comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take
reasonable remedial measures, including, if necessary, disclosure to the
tribunal. A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence, other than the
testimony of a defendant in a criminal matter, that the lawyer reasonably
believes is false.
(b) A lawyer who represents a client in an adjudicative proceeding and who
knows that a person intends to engage, is engaging or has engaged in
criminal or fraudulent conduct related to the proceeding shall take
reasonable remedial measures, including, if necessary, disclosure to the
tribunal.
(c) The duties stated in paragraph (a) and (b) continue to the conclusion
of the proceeding, and apply even if compliance requires disclosure of
information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6 [Confidentiality of
Information].
(d) In an ex parte proceeding, a lawyer shall inform the tribunal of all
material facts known to the lawyer that will enable the tribunal to make an
informed decision, whether or not the facts are adverse.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2002). Interestingly, with regard to the
attorney’s obligation to disclose adverse legal authority pursuant to Rule 3.3(a)(3), a
1972 survey of attorneys in Washington, D.C., found that only seven percent would
disclose adverse legal authority, while ninety-three percent would not. Monroe H.
Freedman, Arguing the Law in an Adversary System, 16 GA. L. REV. 833, 837 (1982).
Freedman correctly argues that we should not overlook the overwhelming weight of
this practical viewpoint in crafting ethical rules to guide the profession. Id.
TO THE BAR IN MASSACHUSETTS 16
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38

conflict with the lawyers’ duties as advocate. As made explicit in
Rule 3.3(b), the Model Rules reject the view that, at least in certain
cases, preserving the sanctity of client confidences should trump the
39
lawyer’s duty of candor toward the tribunal. Put another way, the
Model Rules resolve quite facilely the dilemma between the criminal
defense lawyer’s competing roles, and simply declare that the lawyer’s
duty of candor toward the tribunal trumps the lawyer’s role as zealous
40
advocate for her client.
The commentary to Rule 3.3 makes clear that the lawyer’s
obligation of candor toward the tribunal is premised on the lawyer’s
role as an “officer of the court” and, as such, on an idea of the lawyer
as having a responsibility to uphold the “integrity of the adjudicative
41
process.” The commentary to Rule 3.3 recognizes that the attorney
has a professional responsibility—as an advocate—both to present
her client’s case with “persuasive force” and to maintain client
confidences, but swiftly moves to qualify these advocacy-based duties.

38. When the Model Rules were under consideration, one area of significant
disagreement had to do with whether the arguably broadened duty of candor would
interfere with the attorney’s historic role as zealous advocate. See Freedman, supra
note 37, at 837–39 (arguing that it should not be required for lawyers to cite adverse
authority when overlooked by opposing counsel because of the lawyers duty of loyalty
and zealous representation, as discussed in Canons 5 and 7 of the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility); see also Daisy Hurst Floyd, Note, Candor Versus Advocacy:
Courts’ Use of Sanctions To Enforce the Duty of Candor Toward the Tribunal, 29 GA. L. REV.
1035, 1039–40 & n.19 (1995) (arguing that the duty of candor is so narrowly drawn
in the Model Rules as to render it meaningless).
39. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(b) (2002) (“A lawyer who
represents a client in an adjudicative proceeding and who knows that a person
intends to engage, is engaging or has engaged in criminal or fraudulent conduct
related to the proceeding shall take reasonable remedial measures, including, if
necessary, disclosure to the tribunal.”).
40. See RONALD D. ROTUNDA, LEGAL ETHICS: THE LAWYER’S DESKBOOK ON
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 441 (2000) (noting that although the consequences of
disclosing criminal behavior or false testimony can be “grave” to the client, the
alternative—subverting the advocacy process and possibly the attorney being a party
to fraud—is worse). Rotunda agrees with the approach of the Model Rules but
points out that the view is not universally held. Id. An outspoken opponent of this
approach is Monroe Freedman. See, e.g., MONROE FREEDMAN, LAWYERS’ ETHICS IN AN
ADVERSARY SYSTEM 2–8 (1975) [hereinafter FREEDMAN, ADVERSARY SYSTEM]
(emphasizing complete confidentiality between the attorney and her client, except
for very narrow exceptions); MONROE FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING
LAWYERS’ ETHICS 71 (3d ed. 2004) [hereinafter FREEDMAN & SMITH, UNDERSTANDING
LAWYERS’ ETHICS] (“The ethic of zeal is, therefore, pervasive in lawyers’ professional
responsibilities because it informs all of the lawyer’s other ethical obligations with
entire devotion to the interest of the client.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
41. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 2 (noting that advocacy for
one’s client is “qualified” by candor to the process); see also id. at 3.3 cmt. 12 (noting
that criminal or fraudulent conduct related to the proceeding must be disclosed to
the tribunal in order to preserve the integrity of adjudicative process).
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The lawyer’s role as advocate “is qualified by the advocate’s duty of
42
candor toward the tribunal.”
The obligation of candor is often-cited and ill-defined. In almost
no factual context is there a consensus on what the defense lawyer is
(and is not) required to do in order to fulfill this obligation of
candor. As noted by Monroe Freedman, the Model Rules continue to
dodge the irreconcilable conflict between this “obligation” and other
mandatory duties of the lawyer: “[One way] of avoiding the difficult
questions has been by issuing statements or codifications of rules of
conduct in such a way as to give lip service to basic systemic values,
while ignoring the fact that some of those values are fundamentally at
43
odds with each other.” To understand what meaning candor has
and what limitations it places upon the defense lawyer, one must look
at the concept alongside the other ethical concepts that guide the
lawyer.
B. A Brief History of Zeal
Like the lawyer’s duty of candor toward the tribunal, the concept
of zeal in the lawyer’s representation of her client has antecedents in
44
early Roman law. Charles Wolfram has described zeal as central to
the role of the lawyer in our legal system: “[T]he American lawyer’s
professional model is that of zeal: a lawyer is expected to devote
energy, intelligence, skill, and personal commitment to the single
goal of furthering the client’s interests as those are ultimately defined
45
Wolfram goes on to cite Canon 15 of the 1908
by the client.”
American Bar Association (“ABA”) Canons of Professional Ethics:
The lawyer owes “entire devotion to the interest of the client,
warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights and the
exertion of his utmost learning and ability,” to the end that
nothing be taken or be withheld from him save by the rules of law,

42. Id. at 3.3 cmt. 2.
43. FREEDMAN, ADVERSARY SYSTEM, supra note 40, at vii.
44. See ROSCOE POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 54 (1953)
(describing Roman laws from the third century that prohibited, for example, a
lawyer from accepting a fee and not thereafter pursuing a case, or a lawyer accepting
fees from opposing sides in a case); see also Andrews, supra note 27, at 1389–1408
(describing standards of professional conduct in England before the nineteenth
century, emphasizing its impact of the standards in the United States).
45. CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 578 (1986); see Abbe Smith,
Burdening the Least of Us: ‘Race-Conscious’ Ethics in Criminal Defense, 77 TEX. L. REV.
1585, 1589 (1999) (describing the requirement of zealous advocacy “the central
ethical mandate for criminal lawyers”).
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legally applied. No fear of judicial disfavor or public unpopularity
46
should restrain him from the full discharge of his duty.

The concept of zeal as a guiding principle for any lawyer in the
47
Anglo-American legal system is uncontroversial. By the end of the
thirteenth century, all English lawyers practicing in the ecclesiastical
courts were required to swear that they would “diligently and
48
faithfully serve their clients.”
As deeply ingrained in our legal culture as the principle of zealous
representation, similarly accepted is the fact that the principle of
49
zealous representation is not absolute and is, in fact, well-qualified.
A lawyer, to use the most obvious example, is not permitted to
commit a crime in order to benefit her client. Anita Bernstein charts
the waxing and waning of the bounds of zeal in her article, The Zeal
Shortage, and suggests that the ideal of zeal, if perhaps not the practice
50
of zeal, “may have hit its peak in ‘vigor’ about a hundred years ago.”
Bernstein laments the demise of zeal as a lawyerly ideal, and calls for
a return to “this great ideal . . . up there in the professional51
responsibility pantheon next to loyalty and competence.”
Unfortunately, zeal today may be faring no better in practice than in
46. WOLFRAM, supra note 45, at 578. According to Wolfram, the quotation in
Canon 15 is attributable to George Sharswood. Id. (citing GEORGE SHARSWOOD, AN
ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 24 (2d ed. 1860)). Alabama was the first state to
adopt a code of ethics for lawyers in 1887. Carol Rice Andrews, The Lasting Legacy of
the 1887 Code of Ethics of the Alabama State Bar Association, in CAROL RICE ANDREWS ET
AL., GILDED AGE LEGAL ETHICS: ESSAYS ON THOMAS GOODE JONES’ 1887 CODE AND THE
REGULATION OF THE PROFESSION 7, 7 (2003) [hereinafter ANDREWS, GILDED AGE LEGAL
ETHICS]. The 1887 Alabama Code of Ethics provided that “[a]n attorney ‘owes entire
devotion to the interest of his client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of
his cause, and the exertion of the utmost skill and ability,’ to the end, that nothing
may be taken or withheld from him.” CODE OF ETHICS para. 10 (Ala. State Bar Ass’n
1887), reprinted in ANDREWS, GILDED AGE LEGAL ETHICS, supra, at 45, 50.
47. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. (2002) (explaining that
the lawyer has many roles in society, one of which is being a zealous advocate for her
client).
48. The history of the development of ethics oaths and the evolution of ethical
requirements for advocates in thirteenth-century England are detailed in Andrews,
supra note 27, at 1387. Notably, the same regulations, promulgated in 1295, that
required this early version of the duty of zeal to one’s client also provided for
appointment of counsel at no cost to indigent litigants. See id. at 1394 (explaining
that the regulations provided, besides “appointment of counsel for indigent
litigants,” other standards, such as litigation fairness, candor, and reasonable fees
(citing PAUL BRAND, THE ORIGINS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 154 (1992)). By 1312,
lawyers in the ecclesiastical courts were required to represent the poor at no cost. See
id. at 1394 & n.69 (explaining that the duty to serve the poor was documented as
early as the twelfth century).
49. See WOLFRAM, supra note 45, at 579 (“Indeed, the approach of most discourses
on the work of lawyers—as of all of the lawyer codes and treatises such as this—is to
postulate a principle of zeal and then move quickly and more voluminously to hedge
it about with necessary restrictions and qualifications.”).
50. Anita Bernstein, The Zeal Shortage, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1165, 1165 (2006).
51. Id. at 1169.
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theory; the perception and reality of underzealous representation
52
continues to plague the world of indigent criminal defense. No
discussion of zeal in lawyering would be complete without a look at
the classic articulation in defense of zeal: Lord Henry Brougham’s
53
statement regarding his defense of Queen Caroline in 1820. Lord
Brougham had evidence that, if presented publicly, would, at a
minimum, embarrass King George IV and, at worst, could have led to
54
the monarch being forced from the throne. Speaking before the
House of Lords, Lord Brougham explained in no uncertain terms
that, if the case against Queen Caroline went forward, he would be
bound only to achieve the interests of his client, without regard for
the consequences to king or to country:
[A]n advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one
person in all the world, and that person is his client. To save that
client by all means and expedients, and at all hazards and costs to
other persons, and amongst them, to himself, is his first and only
duty; and in performing this duty he must not regard the alarm,
the torments, the destruction which he may ring upon others.
Separating the duty of the patriot from that of an advocate, he
must go on reckless of the consequences, though it should be his
55
unhappy fate to involve his country in confusion.
56

Lord Brougham’s statement is widely—although not universally —
accepted today as an accurate articulation of the role of the lawyer
57
within the American adversarial system of justice.
52. See ALAN DERSHOWITZ, THE BEST DEFENSE 410 (1982) (“I have been accused
several times of overzealousness. I confess my guilt. In a world full of underzealous,
lazy, and incompetent defense lawyers, I am proud to be regarded as overzealous on
behalf of my clients.”).
53. See Abbe Smith, When Ideology and Duty Conflict, in ETHICAL PROBLEMS FACING
THE CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYER 18, 26 (Rodney Uphoff ed., 1995) (citing BROUGHAM,
LIFE AND TIMES OF LORD BROUGHAM 405–07 (n.d.)).
54. Id.
55. Id. The evidence to which Brougham was referring involved general gossip
regarding King George IV’s “indiscretions,” but also specific evidence that the king
had contracted a marriage with a Roman Catholic, a charge that, if proven, would
have resulted in the king automatically being stripped of his crown. WOLFRAM, supra
note 45, at 580 n.82 (citing DAVID MELLINKOFF, THE CONSCIENCE OF A LAWYER 188–89
(1973)).
56. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, How To Win the Trial of the Century: The Ethics of
Lord Brougham and the O.J. Simpson Defense Team, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 291, 320–21
(1998) (urging a retreat from Brougham-style zeal and a return to “civility, trust, and
fair dealing”).
57. More than 150 years later, the Mississippi Supreme Court provided its own
version of Lord Brougham’s defense of zeal. Declining to pre-emptively enjoin an
attorney’s anticipated breach of the Mississippi State Bar’s Code of Professional
Responsibility, the court explored the principle of zeal in a modern context:
A lawyer is and must be the ultimate advocate. He speaks for and in the
interest of his client . . . . And when his client is on the ropes, the lawyer,
standing alone if need be, is that one person who, in the interest of his
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Zeal is a crucial component of client-centered representation and
is at the heart of meaningful lawyering. The client-centered
approach promotes values of autonomy and dignity of the client and,
58
The recognition of zeal as a
therefore, of the system generally.
paramount principle is especially pronounced in the criminal
defense context, where the stakes are such that the lawyer for the
59
accused must adopt her client’s cause as her own. The Model Rules,
however, consign zeal to the preamble, and effectively subordinate it
60
to the principle of candor.
Any good criminal defense lawyer begins from a presumption of
61
zealous representation. Although sometimes criticized by scholars,
it is an article of faith among good defense lawyers—and
client, skillfully defies the state, the opposing litigant, or whoever threatens.
The lawyer is prepared to stand against the forces of hell though others see
that as his client’s just desert. He assures all adversaries, in the vernacular of
the streets, “You may get my client but you’ve got to come through me first.”
Thornton v. Breland, 441 So. 2d 1348, 1350 (Miss. 1983). As colorfully as Lord
Brougham, the Mississippi Supreme Court recognizes the sanctity of the role of
lawyer as zealous advocate and the unique nature of that relationship. See id. at 1350
(“We regard the lawyer’s right and responsibility of zealous advocacy on behalf of his
client among the most precious forms of speech.”). The question in Thornton was
whether a court could enjoin the participation in a case of a lawyer who appeared to
be in the process of violating one of the canons of that state bar’s canons of ethics, or
whether the appropriate course of action was to wait until after the violation had
occurred before imposing any discipline on the attorney. See id. at 1348 (“In our
view it is ordinarily inappropriate for this Court, or any other court of this state for
that matter, to restrain or enjoin in advance threatened or anticipated violations of
our Disciplinary Rules.”).
58. See Kruse, supra note 8, at 369 (explaining the tension between lawyer
neutrality and methods of lawyering based on the basic tenants of client-centered
representation,
and
further
describing
various
“autonomy-enhancing
intervention[s]” that aid lawyers in knowing how and when to intervene in the client
decision-making process); Charles Ogletree, Beyond Justifications: Seeking Motivations
To Sustain Public Defenders, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1239, 1251 (1993) (arguing that the
moral implications upon a criminal defense lawyer interfere with client autonomy
when society holds the lawyer morally responsible in zealously advocating for the
client’s goals; however, “‘autonomy and equality suggest that . . . the client’s
conscience should be superior to the lawyer’s.’” (quoting Stephen L. Pepper, The
Lawyer’s Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, a Problem, and Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 613, 617–18)).
59. See Bernstein, supra note 50, at 1166 (noting the contentions between zeal
and ethics in writing and codes of professional conduct); Monroe H. Freedman, In
Praise of Overzealous Representation—Lying to Judges, Deceiving Third Parties, and Other
Ethical Conduct, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 771, 771 (2006) (arguing that zealous
representation sometimes requires breaking disciplinary rules, but not unethically);
Abbe Smith, The Difference in Criminal Defense and the Difference It Makes, 11 WASH. U.
J.L. & POL’Y 83, 89–91 (2003) (discussing the interaction of zealous advocacy with
other fundamental principles of law, and arguing that the former should trump
other rules and principles).
60. Indeed, the preamble to the rules states that “[a]s advocate, a lawyer
zealously asserts the client’s position under the rules of the adversary system.”
MODERN RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. (2002).
61. See Alschuler, supra note 56, at 320–21 (citing scholars’ declarations that
zealous representation has changed the legal profession “for the worse”).
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appropriately so—that in the service of her client, a defense lawyer
must pursue any avenue available within the bounds of the law. The
zealous defense lawyer is bound to use any strategy not forbidden by
62
law or ethics. The promise of zealous representation, as embodied
63
64
by Lord Brougham, John Adams, and other defense attorneys,
65
depends upon a commitment to the client above any other loyalty.
66
Moreover, this “pervasive ideal” has long been held to excuse the
defense lawyer from other goals of the system, notably the search for
truth and reliable outcomes at trial. Justice White explained that
truth and reliable outcomes cannot be the goals of the defense
lawyer:

62. See ALAN DERSHOWITZ, REASONABLE DOUBTS: THE O.J. SIMPSON CASE AND THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 145 (1996) (“What a defense attorney ‘may’ do, he must do,
if it is necessary to defend his client. A zealous defense attorney has a professional
obligation to take every legal and ethically permissible step that will serve the client’s
best interest—even if the attorney finds the step personally distasteful.”). Abbe
Smith has written extensively in defense of this notion of zeal and against the idea of
the lawyer as having divided or conflicting loyalties. See, e.g., Abbe Smith, Defending
Defending: The Case for Unmitigated Zeal on Behalf of People Who Do Terrible Things, 28
HOFSTRA L. REV. 925, 958 (2000) (arguing that an attorney has an obligation to do
whatever possible to successfully defend her client, by doing what is best for the
client, and not what is best for the lawyer or the community at large); Smith, supra
note 45, at 1589–91 (arguing that criminal defense lawyers are protectors of
individuals, not communities, and that favoring a softer approach to zealous
advocacy disadvantages the poor, black, and imprisoned). For a contrary position,
see Anthony Alfieri, Defending Racial Violence, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1301, 1306 (1995)
(arguing against the practice of criminal defense lawyers using “racialized” defense
theories on the grounds that the practice perpetuates racial stereotypes and arguing
that criminal defense lawyers have a duty not only to their individual clients but to
the communities to which those clients belong).
63. See supra notes 49–50 and accompanying text (surveying the development of
zealous advocacy as an ethical canon).
64. In 1770, future-President Adams agreed to represent the British soldiers
accused of murdering colonists in what came to be known as the Boston Massacre.
His representation of the British soldiers, in the environment of pre-revolutionary
Boston, was seen by many as something approaching treason. At trial, Adams won
acquittals for the British officer and six of the eight soldiers who had been charged
with murder. For an account of Adams’s involvement in the case within the context
of criminal defense ethics, see Smith, supra note 2, at 38–43 (describing the history of
John Adams as both a patriot and a defender of individual rights and concluding
that although his practice suffered as a result of his defense work for the British, he
was eventually more respected for his integrity and advocacy). See also DAVID
MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS 66 (2001) (noting John Adams’s belief that “no man in a
free country should be denied the right to counsel and a fair trial”).
65. See Uelmen, supra note 24, at 122 (“I would take this position a step beyond
simply rejecting the suggestion that lawyers owe some higher duty to their country. I
would argue that it would be unethical for a lawyer who felt some higher duty to act
upon it to the detriment of the client.”).
66. See FREEDMAN & SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS, supra note 40, at 71–
127 (stating that zeal conditions all the other ethical obligations of an attorney by
demanding entire devotion to the client’s best interests, and discussing zeal in the
context of choosing clients, earning a living, moral limits, ethical rules, and the
courtroom).
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[D]efense counsel has no . . . obligation to ascertain or present
the truth. Our system assigns him a different mission. . . . Defense
counsel need present nothing, even if he knows what the truth is.
He need not furnish any witnesses to the police, or reveal any
confidences of his client, or furnish any other information to help
the prosecution’s case. . . . In this respect, . . . as part of the duty
imposed on the most honorable defense counsel, we countenance
or require conduct which in many instances has little, if any,
67
relation to the search for truth.

If the defense lawyer is not engaged in a search for the truth, as the
other actors in the criminal justice system are, in what sense can she
be obligated to uphold the moral integrity of the proceedings?
Fundamentally, it is through fulfilling her obligation of zealous
representation that she can maintain the integrity and dignity of the
process.
C. The Obligation to Protect Confidences and Secrets
For centuries, Anglo-American law has provided for both a
privilege regarding confidential communications between attorney
and client and a conceptually distinct, but related, principle that
attorneys have a responsibility to protect the “confidences and
68
secrets” of their clients.
Roman law contained the basis for a
privilege for confidential communications between lawyer and
69
client. At least since the time of Elizabethan England, the principle
67. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 256–58 (1967) (White, J., dissenting in
part and concurring in part).
68. It is important to note the distinction between the attorney-client privilege
and the much broader ethical requirement that the lawyer protect confidences and
secrets obtained during the course of the representation. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2002) (describing the instances when it is appropriate for an
attorney to reveal information about her client, such as to prevent death or to
comply with laws and court orders). Whereas the privilege applies to private
communications between lawyer and client, the confidentiality rule applies to those
communications, as well as any other information relating to the representation,
regardless of the source of the information or the manner in which the information
was obtained, as long as the information, if revealed, could be detrimental or
embarrassing to the client. See id. 1.6 cmt. 3 (“The confidentiality rule . . . applies
not only to matters communicated in confidence by the client but also to all
information relating to the representation, whatever its source. A lawyer may not
disclose such information except as authorized or required by the Rules of
Professional Conduct or other law.”); see also FREEDMAN & SMITH, UNDERSTANDING
LAWYERS’ ETHICS, supra note 40, at 131 (explaining the differences between
“confidence” and “secrets,” the former referring to information protected by the
attorney-client privilege and the latter, information that, if disclosed, would be
“embarrassing or detrimental to the client”); infra note 74 (noting the ethical
obligation against disclosing confidential information applies even if the information
is known by others).
69. See Max Radin, The Privilege of Confidential Communication Between Lawyer and
Client, 16 CAL. L. REV. 487 (1928) (detailing the development of the attorney-client
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of confidentiality—at least in broad contour—has been accepted
70
without question in the English and American systems of justice.
Notwithstanding the regular critiques of the privileges as detracting
71
from the search for truth in the legal system, both the “confidential
communication” privilege and the protection against revealing
“confidences and secrets” are firmly embedded in the legal system
and are under no threat of extinction.
The ABA’s Model Code of Professional Responsibility (“Model
Code”) discusses the need for a broad rule prohibiting the disclosure
72
of client confidences and secrets by an attorney. “Both the fiduciary
relationship existing between lawyer and client and the proper
functioning of the legal system require the preservation by the lawyer of
confidences and secrets of one who has employed or sought to
73
employ him.” A strict prohibition against disclosure of confidences
and secrets, then, serves a broader purpose than simply aiding in an
instrumental way a contractual or agency-based relationship; it is
central to the integrity of the legal system. Endorsing the view that
the attorney-client relationship is a “sacred trust,” the Model Code
recognizes that the ethical obligation of an attorney to guard against
disclosure of client confidences and secrets is much broader than the
74
attorney-client privilege and argues that public policy favors a very
75
protective rule.

privilege and the idea of confidentiality between the two, starting with the Roman
law and the relationship between servant and master in that society, and noting how
Roman law was a foundation for the English rule, although its precedent is not
documented).
70. 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2290 (John T.
McNaughton ed., rev. ed. 1961) (charting the history of the attorney-client privilege
back to the reign of Elizabeth I). The improper revelation of client confidences or
secrets was grounds for imprisonment by the fourteenth century in England. See
Jonathan Rose, The Ambidextrous Lawyer: Conflict of Interest and the Medieval and Early
Modern Legal Profession, 7 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 137, 194–95 (2000) (explaining
cases where the lawyer was disloyal fall generally into two types: either the lawyer
(1) uses the information to benefit himself or a third party or (2) discloses the
information to the client’s adversary); see also Andrews, supra note 27, at 1395–96
(explaining that cases involving an attorney’s breach of client confidentiality were
described as cases of deceit and disloyalty).
71. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Search for Truth Continued, the Privilege
Retained: A Response to Judge Frankel, 54 U. COLO. L. REV. 67, 67–68 (1982) (discussing
Judge Frankel’s proposal of a rule to require disclosure of all relevant information in
civil litigation to avoid privilege disputes).
72. See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-1 (1983) (discussing the
importance of a client to be able to openly discuss anything with her lawyer and the
lawyer must also be able to use this trust to obtain information she needs to advocate
on the client’s behalf).
73. Id. (emphasis added).
74. See id. (“The attorney-client privilege is more limited than the ethical
obligation of a lawyer to guard the confidence and secrets of his client. This ethical
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The obligation to protect confidences and secrets is clear,
unambiguous, and mandatory: the lawyer must protect those
confidences and secrets obtained in the course of the representation,
the revelation of which could prove detrimental or embarrassing to
her client. The clarity of this obligation stands in stark contrast to the
more ethereal concepts of candor and zeal. Although the duties of
candor and zeal must inform the actions and decisions of the lawyer,
the “confidences and secrets” requirement provides more concrete
guidance. By upholding its mandate, the defense lawyer fulfills both
her obligation as an officer of the court and her obligation to provide
zealous representation.
II. DUSKY AND ITS DISCONTENTS: THE LAW OF COMPETENCY
AND ITS LIMITATIONS
No person can be required to stand trial unless that person is
76
legally competent, and the conviction of a legally incompetent
77
criminal defendant violates due process. The federal constitutional
baseline for legal competency to stand trial in a criminal case was
78
articulated by the Supreme Court in Dusky v. United States:
a
criminal defendant is competent to stand trial only if that person

precept, unlike the evidentiary privilege, exists without regard to the nature or
source of information or the fact that others share the knowledge.”).
75. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 4 (1983); see also id. at EC 4-1
n.1 (“To permit the attorney to reveal to others what is so disclosed, would be not
only a gross violation of a sacred trust upon his part, but it would utterly destroy and
prevent the usefulness and benefits to be derived from professional assistance.”).
Courts have also endorsed a broad prohibition against disclosure of client
confidences and secrets because of the “peculiarly intimate relationship” existing
between attorney and client. Id. (quoting Ellis-Foster v. Union Carbide & Carbon
Corp., 159 F. Supp. 917, 919 (D.N.J. 1958)).
76. See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 180 (1975) (“[E]vidence of a defendant’s
irrational behavior, his demeanor at trial, and any prior medical opinion on
competence to stand trial are all relevant in determining whether further inquiry [of
a defendant’s competency to stand trial] is required.”); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S.
375, 385 (1966) (holding that defendant’s right not to be tried while incompetent
was violated when adequate procedures were not adhered to, depriving defendant’s
due process right to a fair trial). In the same way that the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment forbids the trial of an incompetent defendant in a criminal case,
the adjudication of an incompetent juvenile in a delinquency proceeding violates
that child’s right to due process. See, e.g., In re W.A.F., 573 A.2d 1264, 1267 (D.C.
1990) (holding that the procedures in place to ensure competency in an adult
criminal trial apply equally to juvenile delinquency proceedings).
77. See, e.g., Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 412 (1993) (noting that it is well
established that “criminal prosecution of an incompetent defendant” violates due
process); Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 453 (1992) (holding that the criminal
trial of an incompetent defendant violates due process); Pate, 383 U.S. at 378 (stating
that “conviction of an accused person while he is legally incompetent violates due
process.”).
78. 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam).
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possesses both a factual and a rational understanding of the
proceedings against her and has the present ability to consult with
79
her lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding. The
Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed that this requirement that
any defendant be competent to understand and assist in the
80
proceedings is central to the American criminal justice system, and
the prohibition against trying an incompetent accused is deeply
81
embedded in common law. The reasons for the prohibition are
premised both on the rights of the individual and, more broadly, on
82
the moral integrity of the criminal justice system. A system that
tolerates the trial of a person who is essentially defenseless and,
perhaps, morally blameless cannot be said to have integrity; further,
trial of such a person would offend deeply held social notions of the
83
dignity of the individual.
Dusky dealt specifically with the competency of a defendant to stand
trial and left open the issue of how courts were to evaluate the
competency of defendants to make other decisions or to waive

79. Id.
80. See, e.g., Drope, 420 U.S. at 172 (“The prohibition [against trying a criminal
defendant who is mentally incompetent] is fundamental to an adversary system of
justice.”); Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 356 (1996) (describing cases from the
eighteenth century in which court required juries to consider the competency of
defendants); Pate, 383 U.S. at 384 (rejecting the argument of the government that
the defendant had waived the issue of competence by failing to raise it, because such
a failure could not constitute a knowing and intelligent waiver).
81. See Drope, 420 U.S. at 171 (noting that the common law competency
requirement is necessary because a mentally incompetent defendant is “in reality
afforded no opportunity to defend himself”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
82. The question of competency to stand trial is, of course, a separate analytical
question from whether a defendant is criminally responsible for her actions. A
defendant may have a valid defense of diminished capacity or insanity and still be
perfectly competent to stand trial and, conversely, a defendant may have been
entirely lucid during the commission of an offense but later become incompetent, by
reason of mental illness, injury, or disease. The constitutional requirement that a
criminal defendant be legally competent stands entirely apart from the question of
availability of any “mental health” defenses that may mitigate criminal culpability.
Blackstone wrote that:
[I]f a man in his sound memory commits a capital offence, and before
arraignment for it he becomes mad, he ought not to be arraigned for it,
because he is not able to plead to it with that advice and caution that he
ought. And if, after he has pleaded, the prisoner becomes mad, he shall not
be tried; for how can he make his defence?
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES *24.
83. See Brief of the American Ass’n on Mental Retardation et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioner at 13, Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782 (2001) (No. 00-6677),
2001 WL 30662, at *13 (observing that “[c]ompetence to stand trial is a unique issue
at the intersection of law and mental disability” and stating that preventing the trial
of incompetent individuals provides important protections for both the defendant
and court).
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84

In Godinez v.
particular rights in connection with their cases.
85
Moran, the Supreme Court held that the standard for competency to
stand trial is identical to the standard of competency to waive
constitutional rights, such as the right to counsel and the right to
86
trial.
The extremely low standard of competency articulated in
Dusky has become the sole test that courts use in determining
whether a defendant is or is not competent to proceed in a criminal
87
case.
Criticisms of this unitary approach to competency were
anticipated by Justice Blackmun, who argued in dissent that
“[c]ompetency for one purpose does not necessarily translate to
88
competency for another purpose.” Blackmun opposed the adoption
of one unitary standard for competency and argued instead that the
competency standard should vary depending on the particular
89
question facing the putatively incompetent defendant.
Since
Godinez, the majority’s adoption of the “all or nothing” unitary
standard has been widely criticized by practitioners, academics, and
mental health professionals, as being overly simplistic and
90
unworkable. Indeed, the Court recently retreated from the notion
91
of a unitary standard of competency and held, in Indiana v. Edwards,
that a defendant who is competent to proceed to trial is not
92
Although the Edwards
necessarily competent to waive counsel.
Court stopped short of repudiating the logic of Godinez, the decision
refers approvingly to the existence of differing degrees of
“adjudicative competence” and certainly seems to undercut the
84. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 403 (1960) (per curiam); see Indiana v.
Edwards, 128 S. Ct. 2379, 2380 (2008) (explaining that Dusky did not consider the
relation of the mental competence standard to the self-representation right).
85. 509 U.S. 389 (1993).
86. Id. at 396–99.
87. Of course, Dusky and Godinez establish a federal constitutional minimum for
determination of competency. States remain free to require a showing of
competency by a higher standard, which would be more protective of due process
concerns. Id. at 402.
88. Id. at 413 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
89. See id. (arguing that Supreme Court cases have always recognized that a
defendant’s mental condition may be relevant to more than one legal issue, each
governed by distinct rules reflecting quite different policies) (internal quotations
omitted).
90. See, e.g., JOHN PARRY & ERIC Y. DROGIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW, EVIDENCE, AND
TESTIMONY 8–9 (2007) (discussing the MacArthur Adjudicative Competence Study
which found, inter alia, that defendants may be incompetent for one legal purpose
but not for another); Sara Longtain, The Twilight of Competency and Mental Illness: A
Conciliatory Conception of Competency and Insanity, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 1563, 1575–78
(2007) (denoting that several scholars support splitting the determination of
competency into two: competence to assist counsel and decisional competence).
91. 128 S. Ct. 2379 (2008).
92. See id. at 2394 (holding only that lack of mental competence can, under some
circumstances, form a basis for denying the right to proceed pro se).
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93

Both substantively and procedurally, the
holding of Godinez.
doctrine of competency in the criminal context is ripe for fresh
theorizing and development.
Procedurally, the question of which party bears the burden of
proof on the question of competency varies based on jurisdiction
94
and, in many jurisdictions, there is no clear answer. Because there is
95
often no clear allocation of burden of proof and no clear
93. See id. at 2386 (explaining that within each domain of adjudicative
competence—competence to assist counsel and decisional competence—the data
indicate that understanding, reasoning, and appreciation of the charges against a
defendant are separable and somewhat independent aspects of functional legal
ability).
94. Compare Smith v. State, 918 A.2d 1144, 1148 (Del. 2007) (asserting that the
government bears the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence,
regardless of whether the defendant is a juvenile or an adult), Commonwealth v.
Brown, 872 N.E.2d 711, 722 (Mass. 2007) (stating that the government bears the
burden of proving competency by a preponderance of the evidence), and State v.
Ganpat, 732 N.W.2d 232, 238 (Minn. 2007) (noting that under state rules of criminal
procedure the government must show the defendant’s competency by a “fair
preponderance of the evidence”), with Velazquez v. State, 655 S.E.2d 806, 809 (Ga.
2008) (declaring that the defendant bears the burden of proving incompetency by a
preponderance of the evidence), Ross v. State, 98-DP-01038-SCT (¶ 90) (Miss. 2007),
954 So. 2d 968, 1007 (expressing that where there is a serious question about the
sanity or competency of a defendant to stand trial, it naturally falls upon the
defendant to go forward with the evidence to show her probable incapacity to make a
rational defense), and Commonwealth v. Rainey, 928 A.2d 215, 236 (Pa. 2007)
(indicating that the burden is on the defendant to prove, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that she was incompetent to stand trial).
95. The federal statute dealing with the competency of criminal defendants does
not explicitly allocate a burden of proof on the issue. See 18 U.S.C. § 4241 (2006)
(allowing either the defendant or government attorney to file a motion for a
competency hearing). Notably, in Cooper v. Oklahoma, the Court, in dicta, cited this
provision and stated: “Congress has directed that the accused in a federal
prosecution must prove incompetence by a preponderance of the evidence.” 517
U.S. 348, 362 (1996). This appears, however, to be a mistake, because nothing in the
text of § 4241 allocates the burden in this manner, and the vast majority of federal
cases construing the statute place the burden on the government, rather than on the
accused. Indeed, virtually every federal circuit to address the issue has construed the
statute to place the burden of proof on the prosecution. See, e.g., United States v.
Hoskie, 950 F.2d 1388, 1392 (9th Cir. 1991) (asserting that the government has the
burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is
competent to stand trial); United States v. Hutson, 821 F.2d 1015, 1018 (5th Cir.
1987) (stating that the state must prove by a preponderance of evidence that the
defendant was competent to stand trial); Brown v. Warden, Great Meadow Corr.
Facility, 682 F.2d 348, 349 (2d Cir. 1982) (citing cases supporting the view that once
a defendant’s competency has been called into question, the burden rests on the
prosecution to prove the defendant is competent to stand trial); United States v.
Hollis, 569 F.2d 199, 205 (3d Cir. 1977) (“[N]o burden of proof rests on a defendant
to demonstrate his own incompetency.”); United States v. Makris, 535 F.2d 899, 906
(5th Cir. 1976) (“There can be no question that in federal criminal cases the
government has the burden of proving defendant competent to stand trial.”); United
States v. Mason, 935 F. Supp. 745, 759–60 (W.D.N.C. 1996), aff’d, 121 F.3d 701 (4th
Cir. 1997) (stating that the government has the burden of proof to show by a
preponderance of the evidence the defendant’s competency). In addition, federal
law explicitly places the burden on the accused to establish an insanity defense. See
18 U.S.C. § 17(b) (asserting that the defendant has the burden of proving her
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96

articulation of the standard of proof in this area, the opinion and
arguments of the defendant’s own lawyer are often extremely
significant in the determination of competency. The most common
approach (and the most sensible) is a burden-shifting mechanism by
which the party placing competency in question bears the burden of
production on the issue of competency, but the prosecution bears
97
the burden of persuasion. In the typical case, then, the defendant
98
will bear the burden of production, while the government bears the
99
burden of persuasion on the ultimate issue.
insanity defense by clear and convincing evidence). The fact that Congress does not
similarly allocate the burden of proof with regard to competency suggests that
Congress did not intend to force the incompetent accused to bear such a burden.
96. In Cooper, the Court declined to articulate a bright-line rule regarding the
appropriate standard of proof—or even to place the burden of proof squarely on the
government. 517 U.S. at 348. The Supreme Court recognized, however, the
extraordinary interest that an incompetent accused has in not being tried. Id. at 364
(citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 756 (1982)). The Court reasoned: “By
comparison to the defendant’s interest [in not being forced to trial while
incompetent], the injury to the State of the opposite error—a conclusion that the
defendant is incompetent when he is in fact malingering—is modest.” Id. at 365.
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s assessment of the relative potential injuries in
such a proceeding, however, the Court has declined to fashion a rule that placed the
burden of proof invariably with the prosecution. States are free to place that burden
on either the prosecution or the accused, subject to certain limitations, without
violating due process. See Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 449–52 (1992) (finding
no violation of due process where the state legislature had statutorily imposed on the
defendant the burden to prove her own incompetency by a preponderance of the
evidence). Due process does require that a defendant not be compelled to prove her
incompetency by any standard of proof higher than a preponderance of the
evidence. Cooper, 517 U.S. at 358–62 (finding a violation of due process where the
state’s statute created a presumption of competency and placed the burden on the
accused to prove incompetency by clear and convincing evidence).
97. One can think of this burden-shifting scheme as beginning with a
presumption of competency that is overcome by some evidence of incompetency.
98. See, e.g., United States v. Riggin, 732 F. Supp. 958, 963 (S.D. Ind. 1990) (“On
principles of fundamental fairness and due process, courts have appropriately
refused to place the burden of proving incompetency on the defendant. Thus the
burden of proving competency . . . would implicitly fall on the government.”); see also
Diaz v. State, 508 A.2d 861, 863 (Del. 1986) (asserting that the prosecution must
prove the defendant’s competence); People v. McCullum, 362 N.E.2d 307, 309 (Ill.
1977) (finding that it was not the defendant’s burden to prove fitness to stand trial
when she was the one to initially raise the competency issue); Commonwealth v.
L’Abbe, 656 N.E.2d 1242, 1244 (Mass. 1995) (explaining that the defendant claimed
he was not competent to stand trial, thereby placing the burden on the
Commonwealth to prove his competency); State v. Champagne, 497 A.2d 1242, 1245
(N.H. 1985) (holding that, as a matter of law “the State . . . did not meet its burden
of proving . . . that the defendant [had] the ability to consult with his lawyer with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding”); State v. Chapman, 684 P.2d 1143,
1144 (N.M. 1984) (deciding whether the court of appeals erroneously substituted its
judgment for that of the jury in finding that the facts did not support the defendant’s
competence); State v. Heger, 326 N.W.2d 855, 858 (N.D. 1982) (“We agree with the
majority of courts that the prosecution has the burden to establish a defendant’s
capacity to stand trial.”); State v. Garfoot, 558 N.W.2d 626, 628 (Wis. 1997)
(indicating that the defense attorney requested a competency hearing for his client);
Engle v. State, 821 P.2d 1285, 1287–88 (Wyo. 1991) (“The party seeking to show
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Placing the burden of proof on the government makes sense
because of the well-settled and fundamental presumption against
100
trying an incompetent person. It is preferable for courts to err on
the side of competent defendants not being tried by means of a
criminal trial (and rather treated, if appropriate, through means of
civil commitment) than on the side of incompetent defendants,
unable to understand the proceedings against them or to assist in
their own defense, being forced to trial. By placing the burden of
proof on the government, courts prevent the obvious unfairness of
calling upon an accused to somehow prove his competency, which is
101
the very thing that is genuinely in question.
But for all this talk of competency, what does it require? In Riggins
102
v. Nevada, Justice Kennedy, in a concurring opinion, described
competency as follows:
Competence to stand trial is rudimentary, for upon it depends
the main part of those rights deemed essential to a fair trial,
including the right to effective assistance of counsel, the rights to
summon, to confront, and to cross-examine witnesses, and the
right to testify on one’s own behalf or to remain silent without
103
penalty for doing so.

Obviously, the competency vel non of a defendant is not fixed for
104
all time once a determination is made.
Defendants can become
competence to stand trial has the burden to show it . . . . Thus, the State had the
burden of proof at the competency hearing.”) (internal citation omitted).
99. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in Brown v.
Warden, Great Meadow Correctional Facility, set out this standard clearly:
In the absence of any indications to the contrary, a defendant charged with
criminal behavior is presumed to be mentally competent to stand trial.
However, once a defendant’s competency has been called into question,
either by the defendant or the prosecution expressly raising the issue, or
through the presence of “warning signals” which cause the court to raise the
question sua sponte, the burden is placed on the prosecution to prove that
the defendant is mentally competent to stand trial.
682 F.2d 348, 349 (2d Cir. 1982). To say that there is initially a “presumption of
competency” is only to say that, in the ordinary case, the trial of the person charged
with a crime will follow in the normal course of events. Only if there is some reason
to doubt the competency of the accused, then does it become an issue. See United
States v. DiGillo, 538 F.2d 972, 988 (3d Cir. 1976) (finding that evidence showing
competency must be more persuasive that that showing incompetency which
necessitates that the burden of proof cannot be placed on the defendant).
100. Cooper, 517 U.S. at 353.
101. See Riggin, 732 F. Supp. at 963 (citing DiGilio, 538 F.2d at 972) (listing
principles of fundamental fairness and due process as the key reasons for refusing to
place the burden of proving incompetency on the defendant).
102. 504 U.S. 127 (1992).
103. Id. at 139–40 (citing Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171–72 (1975)).
104. See Indiana v. Edwards, 128 S. Ct. 2379, 2386 (2008) (“Mental illness itself is
not a unitary concept. It varies in degree. It can vary over time. It interferes with an
individual’s functioning at different times in different ways.”).
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competent to stand trial after having been found incompetent, and
the opposite can occur as well. Due process requires that an accused
105
must be competent at all stages of the proceedings against her.
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s holding in Godinez,
competency—as a logical matter—is much more than simply
competency to stand trial. A defendant must, for example, possess a
rational and a factual understanding of the advantages and
disadvantages of pleading guilty, of choosing between a jury trial and
a bench trial, or of choosing between different defense theories.
Depending on the circumstances of the case, this understanding may
require a higher level of sophistication than an understanding of the
trial process itself.
Complicating the issue of competency is the level of complexity of
charges the defendant is facing. The ABA’s Criminal Justice Mental
Health Standards state that any evaluation of competency must
consider, inter alia, whether the accused’s ability to understand the
process is proportional to the relative complexity and severity of the
106
case. If this is true, then the same person at the same mental stage
might be competent to proceed to trial in a drug possession case but
be incompetent to stand trial in a complex conspiracy case, for
example. Dusky seems to anticipate this “sliding scale” of competency
by focusing on the defendant’s ability to possess a reasonable degree
of rational understanding of the proceedings against her, suggesting
that the standard for competency could vary based upon the nature
107
of the proceedings the defendant faces.
Approaching “decisional
competency” as the ability to make a rational choice on a particular

105. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES *24 (stating that a defendant must
be competent throughout all phases of the criminal process such that, if the
defendant “loses his senses” after conviction but before judgment is entered,
judgment will be stayed; or if the defendant becomes incompetent after judgment
but prior to its execution, then execution of the judgment will be stayed); see also
GARY B. MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS: A HANDBOOK
FOR MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYERS 126–27 (3d ed. 2007) (tracing the
common law roots of the principle that an accused must be competent throughout
every part of the court proceedings against him).
106. CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS 7-4.1, 7-152, 7-154 (1989); see
Richard J. Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal Defendants: Beyond Dusky and Drope, 47
U. MIAMI L. REV. 539, 548 (1993) (distinguishing between competency to proceed
and “decisional competency”).
107. See Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402–03 (1960) (per curiam)
(agreeing that the test for competence is whether the defendant has “sufficient
present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding -- and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of
the proceedings against him”).
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question in furtherance of a defense strategy is more nuanced and
108
useful than the unitary approach of Godinez.
The traditional Dusky competency test calls for far too narrow an
inquiry into the mental capacity of the accused and, accordingly,
allows defendants who lack the ability to meaningfully assist in their
109
own defense to be put on trial. A meaningful alternative test would
focus more broadly on the critical faculties of the accused—i.e., the
110
ability of the accused to exercise “basic rationality and self-regard.”
To be considered competent, according to this broader and more
meaningful inquiry, a criminal defendant would have to possess:
(1) a rudimentary understanding of the criminal process; (2) the
ability to give non-delusional reasons for making the proposed
decision; and (3) sufficient self-regard to consider alternative
111
reasons.
This proposal is an improvement over the Dusky test
because it allows for a more nuanced understanding of competency
and allows for an understanding of different levels of decisional
competency. The “basic rationality and self-regard” test draws heavily
112
Either proposal
on Bonnie’s concept of “decisional competency.”
would constitute a significantly higher—and more accurate—
standard of determining competency of a criminal defendant to
meaningfully take part in her own defense.
III. ETHICAL GUIDANCE IN DEFENDING A MENTALLY IMPAIRED CLIENT
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct are not helpful in
guiding a criminal defense lawyer representing a client with mental

108. Richard Bonnie divides the competency inquiry into two parts: competency
to assist counsel and decisional competency. Bonnie, supra note 106, at 548. While
he posits the ability to assist counsel as a “foundational requirement” to adjudication,
he argues that decisional competency is a “contextualized concept,” that should be
assessed in the context of the decisions, if any, that a defendant is called upon to
make during the course of a trial or a case. Id. One of the “cognitive tasks” that
Bonnie believes is a necessary component of “decisional competency” is the ability
“to understand and choose among alternative courses of action.” Id. at 556.
109. Christopher Slobogin & Amy Mashburn, The Criminal Defense Lawyer’s
Fiduciary Duty to Clients with Mental Disability, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1581, 1590–94
(2000).
110. See id. at 1584 (explaining that this test is probably more demanding than the
Supreme Court’s test but significantly less stringent than some lower courts).
111. Id.
112. See Bonnie, supra note 106, at 555 (characterizing “decisional competence” as
independently significant if and only if defendant is competent to assist counsel; as
required only when a decision must be made by the defendant; promoting interest in
autonomous decision-making by defendant; as understanding that the abilities
required, and legal test, vary according to decision-making; and as incompetence not
precluding adjudication).
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impairment. Rule 1.14, entitled “Client with Diminished Capacity,”
offers no substantive guidance to the lawyer other than to maintain
that “as far as reasonably possible . . . a normal client-lawyer
114
relationship with the client.” The Rule goes on to provide for the
taking of “reasonably necessary protective action” to prevent harm to
a client, including consultation with others who “have the ability to
take action to protect the client and, in appropriate cases, seeking the
115
appointment of a guardian ad litem, conservator or guardian.”
Finally, the Rule deals with the intersection of the lawyer’s duty to
protect client confidences and secrets, and the lawyer’s duty to
protect a client with diminished capacity. While acknowledging that
the rule against disclosure of confidential information applies to
information relating to the representation of a client with diminished
capacity, the Rule qualifies this by clarifying that the lawyer is
impliedly authorized to reveal information about a client with
diminished capacity, “but only to the extent reasonably necessary to
116
protect the client’s interests.”
Model Rule 1.14 and its comments implicitly recognize the conflict
between autonomy and paternalism. Comment 8 recognizes that a
lawyer’s raising of the issue of diminished capacity could lead to her
client being involuntary committed: “The lawyer’s position in such
117
cases is an unavoidably difficult one.”
Comment 6 notes that “the
118
lawyer may seek guidance from an appropriate diagnostician.”
Apart from recognizing the “unavoidably difficult” position of the
lawyer in such a situation, however, the Model Rules provide no real
119
help to the lawyer struggling with this issue.
Most commentators place upon the defense attorney an obligation
to raise the issue of competency of the defendant any time that the
120
attorney believes that his client may not be competent.
Such an
113. See Jan Ellen Rein, Ethics and the Questionably Competent Client: What the Model
Rules Say and Don’t Say, 9 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 241, 242 (1998) (“[N]one of the rules
and authorities give the lawyer adequate guidance for assessing capacity or deciding
how to proceed if doubts exist. Some rules are Delphic at best. The Model Rules
place burdens on lawyers, but neglect to say how the attorney can meet those
burdens without violating other mandatory rules of professional conduct.”).
114. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.14(a) (2002).
115. Id. at 1.14(b).
116. Id. at 1.14(c).
117. Id. at 1.14 cmt. 8.
118. Id. at 1.14 cmt. 6.
119. See supra notes 20, 113 (commenting on the lack of meaningful guidance
offered by existing ethical codes with respect to attorneys representing mentally
impaired clients).
120. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS 7-4.2(c) (1989) (prescribing
that when defense counsel has a good-faith doubt about her client’s competency, she
should move for a competency evaluation, even if the client objects to such a

2008] CANDOR, ZEAL, AND THE SUBSTITUTION OF JUDGMENT

235

approach is not justified by history, necessity, or logic and
undermines the integrity of the attorney-client relationship and,
therefore, the integrity of the criminal justice system. Standard
7-4.2(c) of the ABA’s Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards states:
Defense counsel should move for evaluation of the defendant’s
competence to stand trial whenever the defense counsel has a good
faith doubt as to the defendant’s competence. If the client objects
to such a motion being made, counsel may move for evaluation
over the client’s objection. In any event, counsel should make
known to the court and to the prosecutor those facts known to
121
counsel which raise the good faith doubt of competence.

This proposal is outrageous for three reasons. First, it eradicates
the role of the attorney as advocate for his or her client, in that it
appears to require the attorney to raise the issue of competency
without any regard for the potentially disastrous consequences for
her client. Second, it obligates the attorney not only to advise the
court of the potential issue of competency, but also to advise the
prosecutor of her concerns. Finally, it requires defense counsel to
reveal not only her good-faith doubt about her client’s competency
but also the facts that underlie that belief. Such a proposal
contravenes the ethical requirement that a defense attorney zealously
represent her client and that the defense attorney protect client
confidences and secrets. Nevertheless, this standard has been
122
substantially adopted by the Wisconsin Supreme Court,
the
123
124
Wyoming Supreme Court, the Washington Supreme Court, as
125
well as the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
motion); see also Richard J. Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal Defendants with Mental
Retardation To Participate in Their Own Defense, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 419, 419–
20 (1990) (explaining that the obligation of the trial judge to hold a competency
hearing arises at all stages of the proceeding and whether or not the defense has
requested one); James A. Cohen, The Attorney-Client Privilege, Ethical Rules, and the
Impaired Criminal Defendant, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 529, 532 (1998) (contrasting that
while a defense attorney is required to alert the court of the possibility that her
defendant is incompetent, ethical rules do not allow her to disclose that information
if the attorney received it in confidence).
121. CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS 7-4.2(c) (1989).
122. See State v. Johnson, 395 N.W.2d 176, 182 (Wis. 1986) (holding that where
defense counsel has reason to doubt her client’s competency, she is obligated to raise
the issue with the trial court).
123. See DeShazer v. State, 74 P.3d 1240, 1248 (Wyo. 2003) (observing that
Wyoming law is in accordance with the ABA’s Criminal Justice Mental Health
Standard 7-4.2).
124. See In re Fleming, 16 P.3d 610, 611 (Wash. 2001) (en banc) (finding
ineffective assistance of counsel when counsel knew there was an expert opinion that
the defendant was incompetent to stand trial but failed to raise the issue at any point
during the proceedings).
125. See United States v. Boigegrain, 155 F.3d 1181, 1187 (10th Cir. 1998)
(holding that when a lawyer has reason to believe that her client may not be mentally
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The scholarship on the ethics of criminal defense routinely cites this
126
“obligation” as though it were uncontroversial.
The commentary to Standard 7-4.2 addresses the “apparent
conflict” that can befall a defense lawyer representing a potentially
incompetent client “between the obligations . . . (1) effectively to
represent a client’s best interests and (2) to reflect candor toward the
127
tribunal.”
The commentary recognizes the various situations in
which the defense counsel’s decision to raise the spectre of
incompetency could harm the potentially incompetent client but
indicates that the risk of negative outcomes in such situations is
outweighed by the need to maintain the integrity of the proceedings
128
as well as due process concerns. Ultimately, the commentary makes
explicit what the Standard suggests: that in situations involving a
potentially incompetent client, the defense lawyer’s duty of zealous
advocacy must yield to the defense lawyer’s duty of candor toward the
tribunal. The commentary reads: “Standard 7-4.2(c) recommends a
clear requirement that defense counsel raise the issue of a
defendant’s present mental incompetency whenever counsel has a
good faith doubt about competence. It resolves the difficult conflict
of concerns inherent in such circumstances . . . in favor of counsel’s
129
obligation to the court.”
The additional guidance provided by the commentary to defense
counsel will certainly be of cold comfort to the individual defendants

competent to stand trial, she does not render ineffective assistance of counsel by
making her concerns known to the court).
126. See Slobogin & Mashburn, supra note 109, at 119 (arguing that the attorney
has an ethical obligation to ensure the client receives treatment to restore
competency, even if that obligation requires raising the incompetency issue in
court).
127. CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS 7-4.2(c) cmt. (1989). Of
course, the defense lawyer is under no obligation to represent the client’s “best
interests,” but, rather, the client’s stated desires.
128. Id.; Norma Schrock, Defense Counsel’s Role in Determining Competency To Stand
Trial, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 639, 639 (1996). Schrock proposes that all attorneys be
required to present to the court any reasonable doubts of a criminal defendant’s
competency and that defense attorneys could testify at competency hearings, even if
testifying is against her client’s wishes. Id. at 655, 663. Schrock’s proposal would
deprive the defense lawyer of any discretion when representing a marginally
competent client, regardless of the seriousness of the charge or the actual
consequences to the client of a finding of incompetency. Her proposal is based on a
neat distinction between the “moral judgment of the criminal trial” on the one hand
and the “protective intervention in lives of the mentally ill” on the other hand. Id. at
664. What her proposal fails to account for, however, is the real-world manifestation
of a finding of incompetency. Although her proposal is premised on a defense of
personal autonomy, its actual result could well have the exact opposite effect,
depriving marginally competent defendants—or those acting on their behalf—of the
ability to choose between different courses of action, and different consequences.
129. CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS 7-4.2(c) cmt. (1989).
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being harmed by their lawyers’ compliance with Standard 7-4.2(c).
The commentary advises that if compliance with the requirement of
notifying the court to a good-faith doubt about a client’s competency
would cause harm to that client, counsel should work to reform the
system so that future similar defendants will not face such a dilemma:
The conflict, if it exists, arises from a perceived pragmatic failure
of the criminal justice system to live up to its promise, in that the
deficiencies in the system of incompetence evaluation and
treatment implicitly threaten excessive or inappropriate sanctions
against defendants. The standard takes the position that, if such
problems exist, the thrust should be to correct the problems not to
permit a pragmatic but philosophically unsound mechanism to
avoid them. If elements of unfairness are eliminated from the
system, defendants will have little reason to prefer a pragmatic
130
avoidance of the competence issue in favor of trial on the merits.

No mention is made in the commentary about how the individual
defendant or lawyer is to achieve such systemic reform, or what the
defendant should do while awaiting such reform.
An example of the harm that can be done by a lawyer adhering to
the advice of Standard 7-4.2(c) can be seen in the case of O’Beirne v.
131
Overholser. Herbert O’Beirne faced a charge of petty larceny, in the
Municipal Court for the District of Columbia, for stealing three
132
watches and two rings valued at less than one-hundred dollars. The
maximum penalty for petty larceny at the time of O’Beirne’s case was
133
O’Beirne’s lawyer
a term of imprisonment for one year.
“interjected the issue of insanity” prior to trial and succeeded in
134
having his client found not guilty by reason of insanity. In what can
only be described as a “lawyer’s victory,” O’Beirne was then
committed to the local mental hospital, St. Elizabeths, for an
135
indefinite term.
Almost four years later, O’Beirne—still
130. Id. (internal citations omitted).
131. 193 F. Supp. 652 (D.D.C.), rev’d on other grounds, 302 F.2d 852 (D.C. Cir.
1961). O’Beirne predates the promulgation of the ABA’s Criminal Justice Mental
Health Standards.
132. Id. at 657.
133. Id. at 654.
134. Id. Procedurally, the case was somewhat more complicated. O’Beirne had
initially entered a plea of guilty to the charge of petty larceny and received a one year
sentence. Id. at 657. Through counsel, he then successfully moved to withdraw his
guilty plea and vacate the judgment against him. Id. Upon his withdrawal of the
guilty plea, O’Beirne remained incarcerated but in a pre-trial posture, and was
moved between St. Elizabeths Hospital, the District of Columbia Jail, and the
psychiatric ward of the District of Columbia General Hospital. Id. Only after almost
a year of mental examinations and pre-trial detention was O’Beirne finally brought
to trial, in which he was found not guilty by reason of insanity. Id. at 658.
135. Id. at 657.
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involuntarily confined at St. Elizabeths—filed a petition for a writ of
136
In
habeas corpus, seeking his release from the mental hospital.
granting his petition—a decision that was later reversed by the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
137
Circuit —the district judge criticized the lawyer’s decision to raise
the issue of his client’s mental health:
It may not be inappropriate to observe that counsel for
defendants in borderline cases in which the offense is of a type that
would carry at most a short term of imprisonment, frequently do
their clients a disservice when they request a mental examination.
Often the outcome of the examination is that the defendant is
found competent and yet he will have been incarcerated for several
months in the criminal ward of a mental hospital amidst madmen
while the study of his mental state is being conducted; and if he is
eventually convicted and sentenced to imprisonment, his
incarceration is prolonged that much longer. On the other hand,
if he is acquitted on the ground of insanity, he runs the risk of
being incarcerated for a much longer period than might have been
the case if he were sentenced to a short term in jail. Counsel for
defendants are advocates and must have the courage to represent
their clients’ best interests within the orbit of ethical practice.
They must not be deterred by fear of criticism if they would act
according to the highest traditions of the bar. It is not their
function to vindicate the public interest. This is the duty of the
[prosecutor], whose position is not that of a partisan advocate. . . .
Mental examinations and the defense of insanity are better
reserved for capital cases, as well as for cases in which the
defendant runs the risk of being sentenced to imprisonment for a
138
long term.

The observations of the district judge in O’Beirne are unremarkable
to any lawyer who has wrestled with the consequences of choosing
whether to raise the issue of competency.
As a practical matter, this decision is one like any other of the
myriad of strategic decisions that defense counsel must make and
involves the same considerations: do the potential benefits from this
proposed move outweigh the potential harm to my client, and what

136. Id. at 654.
137. See Overholser v. O’Beirne, 302 F.2d 858 (D.C. Cir. 1961). In a fact-intensive
opinion, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the
district court, holding that O’Beirne failed to present sufficient evidence that he
would not be dangerous in the future if released from the mental hospital.
138. O’Beirne v. Overholser, 193 F. Supp. 652, 661 (D.D.C.), rev’d on other grounds,
302 F.2d 852 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
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are the relative likelihoods of both the benefit and the harm? What
is absent from the O’Beirne opinion—and from some of the more
“practical” advice on the issue—is an attempt to harmonize or
reconcile this pragmatic approach with the attorney’s ethical duty of
candor toward the tribunal. As this Article demonstrates, an attorney
who takes the advice of the judge in O’Beirne—that is, the attorney
who makes her decision based on a reasoned analysis of the benefits
and detriments and of how her decisions will actually affect her
client—is acting not only as a zealous advocate for her client but also
in an entirely professional and ethical manner.
The duty of the defense attorney representing a mentally impaired
client cannot be as simple as Standard 7-4.2(c) proposes. The
potentially disastrous consequences that flow from a finding of
incompetency to stand trial—or, sometimes, from a defendant’s mere
involvement in the evaluation process—must be taken into account
when the defense attorney is weighing which course of action to take.
If, for example, the defendant is charged with a very minor offense
for which the maximum term of incarceration is short, the defense
attorney’s acquiescence to or assistance in having her client
institutionalized for incompetency would, in most cases, be
unacceptable, and incompatible with the historical understanding of
140
the defense lawyer as a partisan.
In this scenario, the lawyer finds
139. See ANTHONY AMSTERDAM, TRIAL MANUAL 5 FOR THE DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL CASES
311 (5th ed. 1988). Professor Amsterdam cautions defense counsel on the potential
negative consequences of raising doubts about client competency, and advises
against doing so unless it is in the client’s interest:
“[T]he interjection of psychiatric issues into any criminal case involves
substantial dangers that may offset its contemplated benefits. Its possibly
harmful consequences to the defendant should caution counsel ordinarily
not to bring psychiatric inquiries to the attention of the prosecution and the
court unless the charges against the defendant are serious ones, carrying
heavy penalties, and the prosecutor’s evidence of guilt appears strong.”
Id. Professor Amsterdam approaches the issue from a purely pragmatic angle—as a
question of strategy—and does not address the existence vel non of an ethical
obligation to raise the issue of competency. Professor Amsterdam’s advice is directly
contrary to the relevant ABA Standard, CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS
7-4.2(c) (1989), and is a far preferable approach.
140. The analysis, however, is never easy. An argument can be made that a
lawyer’s duty to her client extends beyond the specific case in which the lawyer is
involved; if the client would benefit from treatment, would the defense lawyer fulfill
her role as zealous advocate for getting her that treatment, even if it must happen
within the structures of the criminal justice system? In Autonomy Versus a Client’s Best
Interests: The Defense Lawyer’s Dilemma When Mentally Ill Clients Seek To Control Their
Defense, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1343 (1997–1998), author Josephine Ross describes her
decision to raise the issue of her client’s competency in such a situation, guided by
what she terms an “ethic of care.” Id. at 1346. Although Ross thoughtfully defends
her approach and her decision in that case, the “ethic of care” is too broad a
principle to meaningfully guide the discretion of well-intentioned lawyers and invites
the lawyer to meddle too much in her client’s life. Ross does address the breadth of
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herself utterly unable to fulfill her ethical obligation zealously to
represent her client and, indeed, is uniquely positioned to harm her
client precisely because of the attorney-client relationship.
If no absolute rule can govern what defense counsel is to do when
representing a mentally impaired (and possibly incompetent) client,
how is the attorney to be guided in deciding what to do? The
American Lawyer’s Code of Conduct drafted by the American Trial
Lawyers Association, provides:
Once a lawyer is committed to represent a client . . . the lawyer
has no discretion, short of withdrawal, to fail to provide the client
with every legal recourse that is . . . in the client’s interests as the
client perceives them. When there is inadequate opportunity for
consultation regarding the client’s interests, the lawyer shall act in
accordance with the lawyer’s reasonable belief as to what the client
141
would perceive to be in the client’s interest.

This approach, though providing less clarity than that proposed by
the ABA, provides more realistic and useful guidance on how a
defense attorney should fulfill her ethical obligation to a client with
whom she is unable to fully communicate. As with the example of a
person accused of a minor offense, for which she faces the prospect
of little or no incarceration if convicted, the conscientious defense
lawyer should evaluate strategically how the client would perceive her
own interest if the client were able. This approach, while trusting
much power to the individual defense lawyer, favors the real-world
consequences to the individual client over the formalistic adherence
to principles of due process that are embodied in the ABA proposal.
The position that a defense lawyer’s primary obligation is to her
client’s interests, as opposed to the integrity of the tribunal or to the
purely formalistic vindication of her client’s rights, is embodied in
the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, which
provides:
A lawyer representing a client with diminished capacity . . . and
for whom no guardian or other representative is available to act,
must, with respect to a matter within the scope of the
representation, pursue the lawyer’s reasonable view of the client’s
objectives or interests as the client would define them if able to

the approach, cautioning that “[a]ny time a lawyer considers using substituted
judgment, some soul searching is required on the part of the lawyer.” Id. at 1372.
141. THE AMERICAN LAWYER’S CODE OF CONDUCT, ch. 3, cmt., reprinted in JOHN M.
BURKOFF, CRIMINAL DEFENSE ETHICS app. C (rev. ed. 2001).
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make adequately considered decisions on the matter, even if the
142
client expresses no wishes or gives contrary instructions.

Just as the ABA’s approach is remarkably restrictive in allowing the
defense attorney to use discretion in pursuing what she perceives
would be in her mentally impaired client’s interest, the Restatement
is remarkably broad. Not only may a defense lawyer employ her own
judgment in the absence of direction from her client, under the
Restatement, she may actually substitute her judgment for that of her
mentally impaired client. The comment to section 24 of the
Restatement more explicitly contradicts the ABA Standard discussed
above regarding a defense lawyer’s obligation vel non of bringing her
143
client’s diminished capacity to the attention of the court. Indeed,
the comment uses discretionary rather than mandatory language in
describing a lawyer’s role in this regard: “A lawyer may bring the
client’s diminished capacity before a tribunal when doing so is
reasonably calculated to advance the client’s objectives or interests as
144
the client would define them if able to do so rationally.” The more
nuanced approach of the Restatement allows a conscientious defense
lawyer to avoid causing harm to her client and to make a decision
based on a broader understanding of what is in the client’s best
interests—or, more accurately, what the client would have wanted if
not for the mental impairment.
The issue of whether defense counsel has an ethical obligation to
inform the court of her doubts regarding her client’s competency to
be tried has not been the sole domain of scholars and writers of
ethical codes; courts have weighed in as well, though less frequently
145
Almost uniformly, courts that have
than one might guess.
considered the question have come down on the side of candor as
146
opposed to zeal.
This orientation is not surprising, given that the
judges have an institutional interest in being as fully informed as
possible about the defendants they face and that the judicial
perspective generally may over-value the procedural principle of the

142. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 24(2) (2000). The
Restatement also provides that a lawyer representing a client with diminished
capacity “may seek the appointment of a guardian or take other protective action,”
but only if doing so “will advance the client’s objectives or interests” as the client
would define them if able to make adequately considered decisions. Id. § 24(4).
143. Id. § 24 cmt. d.
144. Id.
145. See generally O’Beirne v. Overholser, 193 F. Supp. 652, 661 (D.D.C.), rev’d on
other grounds, 302 F.2d 852 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (opining on legal strategy for counsel
representing defendants in borderline cases).
146. See infra notes 148–164, 166–171 and accompanying text (discussing two cases
in which candor prevailed over zeal).
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“integrity of the system” and under-value principles of advocacy, zeal,
147
and substantive result.
148
In In re Fleming, the Washington Supreme Court dealt with this
issue and concluded that defense counsel’s failure to raise his doubts
about his client’s competency constituted ineffective assistance of
149
counsel. While delusional, Fleming armed himself with a gun and
forced his way into a neighbor’s house, where he was shot in the
150
stomach by the homeowner and then arrested.
Fleming was
charged with a litany of offenses, including first-degree burglary and
151
unlawful possession of a firearm.
Early in the proceedings, his lawyer obtained a psychological
evaluation of Fleming, in which the examiner concluded that he was
152
“marginally competent” to stand trial.
Several months later,
153
obtained a separate psychological
Fleming’s new attorney
evaluation from another psychologist, who concluded that Fleming
was “unable to cooperate in a rational manner with counsel in
presenting a defense and is not able to prepare and conduct his own
defense in a rational manner without counsel and therefore is judged
154
presently mentally incompetent to stand trial.”
Neither counsel ever
showed either of these evaluations to the trial judge or the
prosecutor, and no mention was ever made of the concerns about
155
Fleming’s competency until after he had entered a plea of guilty.

147. Courts that have considered the issue are not, by any means, uniform in their
conclusions. Compare Enriquez v. Procunier, 752 F.2d 111, 114 (5th Cir. 1984)
(finding that the trial counsel’s failure to raise the competency issue was a
“reasonable tactical decision” where petitioner claimed counsel had been ineffective
for not raising concerns of incompetency prior to trial on first-degree murder), with
Overholser v. O’Beirne, 302 F.2d 852, 861 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (reversing decision of
lower court, asserting that the judge in the lower court failed to even consider the
question of competency raised by the defendant, nor did the defendant’s counsel
properly raise the issue).
148. 16 P.3d 610 (Wash. 2001) (en banc).
149. Id. at 616–17.
150. Id. at 612–13.
151. Id. at 612.
152. See id. (adding that Fleming had been psychotic at the time of the incident in
question and that he had been “unable to distinguish right from wrong and [had
been] incapable of appreciating the nature and quality of his conduct due to his
paranoid and borderline personality characteristics, as well as his amphetamine
psychosis”).
153. See id. (noting that Fleming’s first attorney withdrew from the case due to her
inability to communicate with Fleming).
154. Id. at 612–13.
155. See id. at 615. Although no mention was specifically made regarding doubts
about Fleming’s competency, his second counsel did give notice that he would be
relying at trial on a diminished capacity defense. Id. at 858–59. Notwithstanding this
red flag having to do with Fleming’s mental capacity (and the fact that two separate
lawyers had separately petitioned the judge for funds to obtain psychological
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156

Fleming entered an Alford plea to three of the charges against
157
him pursuant to a plea bargain. Fleming attempted unsuccessfully
to withdraw his plea prior to sentencing and then unsuccessfully
158
appealed his conviction.
At no time throughout the proceedings
did either of Fleming’s lawyers raise any doubts about their client’s
competency to stand trial or to enter a guilty plea, and no mention
159
was ever made of the two psychologists’ reports.
Fleming then filed a petition for state post-conviction relief,
160
arguing that he had been incompetent to enter a plea of guilty.
When he appealed the denial of his petition, the Washington
Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial
court for failing to conduct a competency hearing because the judge
had not been apprised of any doubts or concerns regarding
161
Fleming’s competency to stand trial or to plead guilty. Troubled by
the course of the proceedings, however, the court found that
Fleming’s plea was invalid because his lawyers had failed to provide
162
effective assistance of counsel.
While acknowledging the
government’s arguments that defense counsel’s failure to raise the
issue of competency or to raise their doubts about Fleming’s
competency a strategic decision, the court issued a blanket ruling
that, as a matter of law, such a tactic—if that is what it was—does not
163
fall within the bounds of effective assistance of counsel. The court
concluded broadly and categorically: “When defense counsel knows
or has reason to know of a defendant’s incompetency, tactics cannot
excuse failure to raise competency at any time so long as such
164
incapacity continues.”
The Fleming court, however, made no effort to justify or even to
explain its conclusion that the failure to raise doubts about
competency can never be an acceptable strategy in defense of a
client. One wonders if a harder case would have produced a
evaluations), the trial judge apparently conducted no inquiry into Fleming’s
competency prior to accepting his plea.
156. In North Carolina v. Alford, the Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant
may plead guilty without actually admitting guilt, as long as the decision to plead
guilty is a knowing, voluntary, and understanding choice from among the options
available to the defendant. 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970).
157. Fleming, 16 P.3d at 613.
158. Id. at 613–14.
159. Id.
160. Id. The procedural vehicle by which Fleming sought state post-conviction
relief is called a personal restraint petition, or a PRP.
161. Id. at 615.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 616–17.
164. Id. at 617 (citations and internal quotations omitted).
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different result: a defendant charged, not with a litany of serious
offenses, but with one count of shoplifting, for which little or no jail
time would result from a conviction.
The Fleming decision,
frustratingly devoid of analysis or discussion of the sometimes
competing obligations of the criminal defense attorney, is cited for
the proposition that a defense attorney must always raise the issue of
competency if she has any doubts about whether her client is
165
competent to proceed. The case is an example of the summary and
uncritical fashion in which courts deal with the conflict between a
lawyer’s role as an officer of the court and as a zealous advocate for
her client.
Other courts have referred uncritically to defense attorneys’
“obligation” to raise the issue of competency if counsel has good-faith
166
doubts. In United States v. Jackson, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit made reference to this issue in its
consideration of whether the trial court erred in granting a
167
competency evaluation at the request of defense counsel.
In
affirming the decision of the trial court to grant a competency
evaluation (and applauding the defense lawyer for raising the issue),
the Sixth Circuit stated that the defense lawyer “was discharging his
‘professional duty’ as an officer of the court to raise the issue if
168
counsel has a good faith doubt as to the defendant’s competence.”
169
Similarly, in State v. Johnson, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that
an attorney has an affirmative obligation to raise the competency
issue, stating in a conclusory fashion “that considerations of strategy
170
are inappropriate in mental competency situations.”
Other courts
that have applied this mandatory disclosure obligation to defense

165. See, e.g., Duty To Alert Court of Client’s Mental Problems, 8 CRIM. PRAC. GUIDE No.
4, at 25, 25 (2007) (providing background on how different jurisdictions deal with
the ethical problems surrounding disclosure of client competency).
166. 2006 FED App. 0312N, 179 F. App’x 921 (6th Cir. 2006) (unpublished).
167. Id. at 19–20, 179 F. App’x at 933.
168. Id. at 19, 179 F. App’x at 933.
169. 395 N.W.2d 176 (Wis. 1986).
170. Id. at 183. Interestingly, seventeen years later, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
held that an attorney’s testimony at a competency hearing about her “opinions,
perceptions, and impressions” of her client’s mental competency fell within the
definition of a confidential communication and, therefore, violated the client’s
statutory right to prevent her lawyer from disclosing those communications. State v.
Meeks, 2003 WI 104, ¶¶ 43–46, 263 Wis. 2d 794, ¶¶ 43–46, 666 N.W.2d 859, ¶¶ 43–
46. Despite the Meeks court’s attempt to reconcile the two decisions, and despite the
Meeks court’s protestations to the contrary, it appears to be a retreat from the Johnson
rule, or at least a significant limitation of that rule.
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attorneys have done so without either analytical or precedential
171
argument.
The different approaches proposed by commentators and courts to
address the problem of zealously representing a mentally impaired
client can form a continuum from vindication of formal rights to
pragmatic assistance of a client. The formalistic approach of the
ABA’s Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards provides clarity and
is founded upon a belief that criminal defendants generally are best
served by an absolute prohibition on the trial of incompetent
defendants and the concomitant vindication of those clients’ right to
due process and fundamental fairness. On a systemic level, this
approach might make sense; similarly, under this approach, the
privileging of the defense lawyer’s obligation to the tribunal as an
officer of the court above the lawyer’s obligation to zealously
represent his client is explained by the focus on systemic integrity.
Because, arguably, a lawyer owes some duty—albeit nebulous and illdefined—to the proper functioning of the legal system, it would be
an abdication of the lawyer’s role as officer of the court not to bring
such information to the attention of the judge. All of this, however,
would be difficult to explain to that single client who has been
confined for months or years in a mental hospital awaiting trial on a
minor offense, having been found incompetent after his own lawyer
raised the issue of competency before the court.
IV. THEORY AND PRACTICE: TWO REAL-WORLD EXAMPLES
In an effort to explore both the theoretical soundness and the
practicality of various theories of what the defense lawyer is obligated
(and allowed) to do when faced with the difficult job of representing
a mentally impaired client, I offer two cases that I handled as a
criminal defense lawyer. Testing theory through the crucible of
practice leads necessarily to both a more nuanced theory and more
172
useful guidance. One of the limitations of the existing scholarship
171. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 252 P.2d 922, 923 (Kan. 1953) (referring to the state’s
“well-settled rule . . . that whenever counsel for the defendant or the state becomes
possessed of knowledge of a defendant’s lack of mental capacity to comprehend his
situation or to properly make his defense, it becomes the duty of each to promptly
bring the matter to the attention of the court”); Hajrusi v. State, No. A03-261, 2003
WL 22481300, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 4, 2003) (“If the prosecutor, defense
attorney, or the court has reason to doubt the competency of the defendant, they are
obligated to raise the issue, even over the defendant’s objection.”) (citing MINN. R.
CRIM. P. 20.01).
172. See Ross, supra note 140, at 1345 (noting that there is “a growing body of
clinical scholarship that recognizes that theory is more likely to be right when it
emerges out of the practice of law”); see also Alexis Anderson, Lynn Barenberg & Paul
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on this issue is that it remains unconnected to practice and to the
173
Anthony Amsterdam famously
actual consequences to clients.
described existing canons of ethics as “vaporous platitudes” that
“have somewhat less usefulness as guides to lawyers in the
predicaments of the real world than do valentine cards as guides to
174
My goal in applying the
heart surgeons in the operating room.”
theory of ethics to actual cases is to be slightly more helpful than that.
A. David Sherman

175

David Sherman had no criminal record when he was arrested at his
home and charged with several counts of kidnapping and seconddegree child sexual abuse. According to the government, Mr.
Sherman had taken two twelve-year-old children into a vacant
apartment in their apartment building and forced them to touch
each other sexually. Although he was not charged with having
molested the children in any way himself, he was facing the possibility
176
of many years in prison.
When I spoke with Mr. Sherman for the first time, at the jail, it was
immediately apparent to me that he was cognitively very slow.
Speaking to him about the case was like speaking to a child. Through
a series of painstaking meetings with him, he eventually came to
understand exactly what he was charged with and how the criminal
justice system functioned. Mr. Sherman and I spent many hours
discussing his case and various aspects of the criminal justice system.
R. Tremblay, Professional Ethics in Interdisciplinary Collaboratives: Zeal, Paternalism, and
Mandated Reporting, 13 CLINICAL L. REV. 659 (2007) (supporting a theoretical
discussion of the different ethical requirements of lawyers and social workers with
two factual scenarios drawing on the authors’ experiences).
173. In addition to Professor Ross’s valuable article critically analyzing her
experiences representing a mentally impaired client, Rodney Uphoff uses a similar
approach in attempting to test theory through the crucible of actual practice,
although not through the lens of his own experience. See Rodney J. Uphoff, The Role
of the Criminal Defense Lawyer in Representing the Mentally Impaired Client: Zealous
Advocate or Officer of the Court?, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 65, 77–83 (detailing the tactical
considerations and ethical dilemmas surrounding one lawyer’s decision to withhold
concerns about her client’s competency).
174. Monroe H. Freedman, Getting Honest About Client Perjury, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 133, 138 (2008) (citing The Law: Professional Ethics, TIME, May 13, 1966, at
81).
175. The names “David Sherman” and “James Murphy” are pseudonyms that are
used only for purposes of this Article. In addition, I have slightly altered the
accounts of their cases in order to protect their anonymity.
176. At that time, second-degree child sexual abuse carried a maximum penalty of
imprisonment for ten years and kidnapping carried a maximum penalty of
imprisonment for thirty years. The penalties are the same under current statutes.
D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 22-2001, 22-3009 (LexisNexis 2001). Had Mr. Sherman been
convicted of the counts, it is possible that each of the sentences would have been run
consecutively. Id. § 23-112.
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I spoke many times with his mother, who filled me in on details of
Mr. Sherman’s childhood and adolescence and who gave me valuable
177
insights into his history and level of functioning. Mr. Sherman had
never been diagnosed with a mental illness, but it certainly seemed
likely that he had some pre-existing mental health problems that had
worsened recently.
In addition to learning about Mr. Sherman and spending time
explaining the system to him, I also set out to investigate the case
against him. When my investigator and I talked to the two children,
they appeared to be credible. Nothing about their stories was
unbelievable, and their versions of what happened did not contradict
each other. To make matters worse, the prosecutor gave me a
videotape in which Mr. Sherman was questioned about the
accusations and admitted to forcing the children to touch each other
sexually in the apartment building. The prospects of acquittal did
not look good.
Throughout the pre-trial period, Mr. Sherman’s competency was in
question. Because of the nature of the allegations and Mr. Sherman’s
bizarre behavior on his first day in court, the judge had ordered a
competency evaluation. After the initial evaluation, Mr. Sherman
was—surprisingly to me—found competent to stand trial, although
the evaluation suggested that he was suffering from mental illness.
Because Mr. Sherman had no prior criminal record, and because he
seemed to be suffering from an untreated mental illness, the
prosecutor made a generous offer to Mr. Sherman: in exchange for a
plea to a greatly reduced charge, the prosecutor would not ask for
more than one year of incarceration and would recommend that the
court then place him on a period of probation, on the condition that
Mr. Sherman receive treatment for his mental illness. Weighed
against the likelihood of a much harsher sentence if we were to lose
at trial and the strong evidence against him, this offer was a good
one. I advised Mr. Sherman to accept this plea offer, and he agreed
that it made sense. Relatively early in the case, Mr. Sherman entered
a plea of guilty to the reduced charge.
177. Much of the literature on surrogate decision-making for mentally impaired
client advises that the lawyer consult closely with family members and others close to
the client and attempt through those inquiries to determine what the client would
want if not for the mental impairment. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 24 cmt. c (2000) (“The lawyer should take reasonable steps to
elicit the client’s own views on decisions necessary to the representation. Sometimes
the use of a relative, therapist, or other intermediary may facilitate
communication.”). The reality of the lives of indigent mentally ill criminal
defendants, unfortunately, is that no family or other support structures exist for the
lawyer to consult. Mr. Sherman was lucky in this regard.
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Because Mr. Sherman had been found competent to stand trial, he
was detained in the jail, rather than in the mental hospital for pretrial detainees whose competency has been questioned or who have
been found incompetent. At the jail, he received no treatment and
no medication for his mental illness. As a result, while he was
awaiting sentencing in the case, Mr. Sherman’s mental illness spiraled
out of control. During a visit a few weeks after he had pled guilty, Mr.
Sherman appeared disheveled and disoriented; he told me he wanted
a trial and he knew that God would protect him. I explained to him
that it was possible to withdraw his guilty plea if he wanted to do that,
and that the judge would probably allow him to do so because it was
still soon after he took the plea. I also advised him, however, that it
still would be a bad idea to withdraw his guilty plea, for all of the
reasons that made him accept the offer in the first place. Mr.
Sherman was adamant that he wanted a trial and adamant that he
wanted to testify. When I asked him what sort of defense he wanted
to present, all he would tell me was that his God was “a mighty God”
and that God would tell him what to say.
Mr. Sherman’s case demonstrates why a simplistic understanding of
competency is unworkable and could do real harm to mentally
impaired criminal defendants without meaningfully vindicating any
real principle of client autonomy. If I had simply done what Mr.
Sherman told me he wanted me to do, I would have been listening
only to the mental illness, rather than the person. Not only would
such an approach have failed to promote Mr. Sherman’s autonomy in
any meaningful sense of the word but it would also have caused
irreparable damage to Mr. Sherman, who would very likely have been
convicted at trial and received a lengthy prison sentence. Under
Dusky, Mr. Sherman may well have been considered competent even
178
in the throes of his mental illness. He understood factually what he
was charged with; he could explain the roles of the various players
involved in his case; and he had some degree of rational
understanding of the charges against him and the defenses available
to him. When I asked him to describe for me what a trial was, he was
able to articulate that it was something where people came in and
said what happened, and the jury decided who to believe. Mr.
Sherman was able to tell me that the prosecutor’s job was to put him
in jail and that my job was to keep him out of jail. He understood
that he would go to jail if the jury thought he had grabbed the
178. See Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (requiring that a
defendant have a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings against her
and the ability to communicate rationally with her lawyer).
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children off of the street and made them touch each other. Under
the traditional standard of competency, therefore, he would probably
be found competent.
It was obvious to me, however, that Mr. Sherman was not thinking
rationally about his situation or about his options. In coming to this
conclusion, of course, I had the advantage of having talked
extensively with Mr. Sherman while he was far more lucid. I was also
able to see the contrast between the more rational Mr. Sherman and
the more delusional Mr. Sherman. He knew he had a right to testify
and insisted on speaking to the jury, but he would only tell me that
God would protect him. He refused to talk about specific witnesses,
pieces of evidence, or defense theories, but he insisted on going to
trial. When I spoke to Mr. Sherman about his mental illness and
whether we should raise that issue with the court, he told me that he
did not want to do that because it would delay his trial. Unlike Dusky,
Slobogin and Mashburn’s test for competency focuses on “basic
179
Mr. Sherman would have to be
rationality and self-regard.”
considered incompetent under this standard because he was—in my
opinion—unable to give non-delusional reasons for his decision to
withdraw his guilty plea and because he lacked sufficient self-regard
to consider alternative reasons and courses of action. The question
was, in Mr. Sherman’s case, whether to (1) move to withdraw his
guilty plea without raising any issue of competency; (2) indicate to
the court his expressed desire to withdraw his guilty plea but also
indicate my own opinion that Mr. Sherman had become
incompetent; or (3) not say anything to the court about Mr.
Sherman’s desire to withdraw his guilty plea. The difficulty of this
decision was compounded by the knowledge that one of the factors a
court considers in deciding whether to allow a defendant to withdraw
a guilty plea is how promptly the desire to withdraw the plea is made
known to the court. In other words, the longer I waited in
determining our next move, the less likely it was that the judge would
allow Mr. Sherman to withdraw his plea.
After much consultation and discussion about what to do in Mr.
Sherman’s case, I went against his expressed wishes and raised the
issue of competency. I told the court that Mr. Sherman had
expressed his desire to withdraw his plea and go to trial. However, I
went on to explain that, in my opinion, though he had been
179. See Slobogin & Mashburn, supra note 109, at 1641 (proposing a test for
competency that focuses on the client’s (1) understanding of the criminal process,
(2) ability to make decisions based on non-delusional reasoning, and (3)
consideration of alternative decisions).
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competent to plead guilty, his mental state had deteriorated to a
point where he was no longer competent to make such a decision. At
the time, Mr. Sherman was lucid enough to understand what I had
done and was outraged by my actions. However, I believed that the
motivation behind Mr. Sherman’s decision to withdraw his plea was
only his mental illness, rather than a rational belief that either that
180
we could win the trial or that he was actually innocent. Ultimately,
the fact that Mr. Sherman was unable to articulate any rational reason
for his desire to withdraw his guilty plea and proceed to trial made
me somewhat comfortable in acting against his expressed interest.
The course of action I chose in Mr. Sherman’s case was well within
my ethical obligations. Under the ABA’s Criminal Justice Mental
Health Standards, I was required to raise the issue of Mr. Sherman’s
181
competency. Under the American Lawyer’s Code of Conduct and
the Restatement, I was required to act in accordance with what Mr.
Sherman’s wishes would have been if not for the mental illness that
182
made his rational consideration impossible.
In this unique case, I
believed Mr. Sherman expressed his true interests to me and I acted
on them by entering his initial guilty plea. On these occasions, Mr.
Sherman appeared competent enough to understand his situation.
Still, even though I believed that I was well within my ethical
obligations to Mr. Sherman and also believed that I was preventing
him from harming himself, was I not also doing some violence to the
principle of autonomy and betraying the concept of client-centered
lawyering?
The concept of client autonomy and the principle of clientcentered lawyering have meaning only to the extent that the client in
question has the ability to think rationally. If the voice that is
speaking is not that of the client but rather of the mental illness that
has control of the client, then it would be irresponsible for the lawyer
183
to follow the commands of the voice simply out of “principle.” To
180. Of course, another rational reason that one could choose to plead guilty is to
accept responsibility and “pay one’s debt to society.” As with the other rational
reasons for making such a choice, I was confident that this was not Mr. Sherman’s
motivation.
181. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS 7-4.2(c) (1989) (explaining
when defense counsel has a reasonable belief that the defendant is incompetent,
counsel must make the issue known to the court).
182. See supra notes 141–144 and accompanying text (discussing the flexible
approaches in the American Lawyers’ Code of Conduct and Restatement and noting how
both approaches are realistic and emphasize that the defense lawyer’s primary
obligation is to her client’s best interest).
183. To illustrate this principle, Slobogin and Mashburn use the extreme example
of a person who is unable to speak and, when asked a question, involuntarily and
randomly either nods her head “yes” or shakes her head “no.” Nobody would argue

2008] CANDOR, ZEAL, AND THE SUBSTITUTION OF JUDGMENT

251

the extent that there exists a continuum between a “client autonomy”
model of lawyering and a “paternalistic” model of lawyering, the first
model depends upon the assumption of a client who is able to make
184
rational choices.
Because of the concerns I raised about Mr. Sherman’s competency,
the judge would not allow him to withdraw the plea. She told Mr.
Sherman that she was going to send him from the jail to the mental
hospital for forty-five days to see how he did. The judge also
explained to him that, at the end of that period, if she thought he was
competent and if he still wanted to withdraw his plea, she would allow
him to do so. Once he was prescribed and began taking medication
at the mental hospital, Mr. Sherman’s condition improved
remarkably. Within a few weeks, he seemed like his old self—still
suffering from mental illness but able to make decisions with some
degree of rationality and to articulate the reasons behind his desires.
When I explained his options again, Mr. Sherman seemed not to
remember clearly that he had wanted to withdraw his plea and go to
trial, and he was very sure that he did not want to withdraw his guilty
plea. Some time later, we proceeded to sentencing, and the judge
placed Mr. Sherman on probation, ordering that he receive
counseling and ongoing medication. Two years later, when I was
working at the Public Defender Service for the District of Columbia,
Mr. Sherman called me and asked if he could stop by. We met in my
office and he told me that he was doing great on probation, had
gotten a job, and was thinking about getting married. In the end, it
seems to have been a good idea to go against the desires that Mr.
Sherman had expressed while he was mentally impaired. Had we
gone to trial, it is likely that Mr. Sherman would have been convicted
of kidnapping and other serious charges, and would have received a
lengthy prison sentence. By substituting my own judgment for that of
the psychotic Mr. Sherman (and depriving him temporarily of his

that taking some important action on the basis of her head nods or shakes would be
appropriate or that doing so would vindicate any principle of autonomy. Slobogin &
Mashburn, supra note 109, at 1587.
184. See William H. Simon, Lawyer Advice and Client Autonomy: Mrs. Jones’ Case,
50 MD. L. REV. 213, 224–25 (1991) (noting the similarities between the refined
paternalist and autonomy approaches and the failure of each approach to be fully
grounded in the value of autonomy); cf. Ross, supra note 140, at 1377 (“I valued Ms.
Teplinski’s choice and autonomy less than I valued it in my other clients because I
believed that she was a woman in mental anguish. Choice and autonomy have little
meaning to a person in the convulsions of a mental disease.”).
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autonomy), I believe that I was able to both serve his best interests
185
and protect his true autonomy in a more meaningful sense.
B. James Murphy
186

James Murphy had been awaiting trial at St. Elizabeths Hospital
for eight months when I met him. Mr. Murphy had no criminal
record whatsoever and was charged with a non-violent, low-level
crime. Mr. Murphy, who had a history of addiction to prescription
medication, had been charged with fraudulently attempting to obtain
prescription medication by pretending to be a doctor.
Because of his erratic behavior during his arrest and in court, Mr.
Murphy was ordered detained for a mental evaluation.
Not
surprisingly, the evaluation indicated that Mr. Murphy was not
competent to stand trial. Although the judge had the option to allow
Mr. Murphy to remain at liberty pending a full competency hearing,
he decided to send him to St. Elizabeths. Notwithstanding the fact
that he had no history of violence or any criminal record, Mr.

185. In his discussion of paternalism and autonomy, David Luban tells the story of
Benedict Spinoza being saved from an angry mob by his landlord and friend, Van
der Spyck. David Luban, supra note 9, at 461. In 1672, an enraged royalist mob
burst into a Dutch prison and killed two men suspected of disloyalty to the Prince of
Orange. Id. Spinoza, who had been a friend of the men, heard the news of their
deaths and immediately set out to confront the mob, having prepared a sign that
read “Ultimi Barbarorum.” (The Latin phrase translates roughly as “you are the
greatest of all barbarians.”) Id. However, before he had a chance to confront the
mob, Van der Spyck locked Spinoza in his house, saving his life in the process.
Three years later, Spinoza published his classic treatise, “Ethics.” Id. Luban cites the
Spinoza story as an example of justifiable paternalism.
See id. at 461–62
(commenting that where a subject’s judgment is obviously impaired and the actor is
convinced that the subject will approve of the actions when he regains his senses,
actions in depriving liberty and free will—like those of Van der Spyck—may be
justifiable).
186. Commissioned by Congress in 1852 as the Government Hospital for the
Insane, St. Elizabeths is still the public mental hospital that serves the District of
Columbia. See Joe Holley, Tussle Over St. Elizabeths, WASH. POST, June 17, 2007, at C1
(reporting on the opposition to the proposed use of the St. Elizabeths property as
the new home of the Department of Homeland Security). The most famous former
resident of St. Elizabeths was the poet Ezra Pound, who was confined there from
1946–1958 after having been found incompetent to stand trial on a charge of
treason. Pound’s case, however, is anything but the usual tale of an incompetent
defendant languishing in pre-trial institutional confinement while he waits to be
restored to competency. According to at least one account, every doctor who
examined Pound found him to be perfectly sane, but the superintendent of the
hospital, Dr. Winfred Overholser, Sr., allowed Pound to remain at the hospital
indefinitely in order to escape criminal prosecution on the capital charge of treason.
Ben A. Franklin, Hospital Once ‘Home’ for Ezra Pound, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1982, at B6.
During his twelve years at St. Elizabeths, Pound was allowed to stay in his own private
room overlooking the U.S. Capitol, was brought books from the Library of Congress
upon request, received special food, and was allowed regularly to meet with visitors.
Id.
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Murphy was detained at St. Elizabeths for eight months while his
competency to stand trial remained in question.
Before I met Mr. Murphy, I reviewed his file. I was struck by the
fact that he had been detained for so long on such a minor charge.
Even if he had been convicted of the charge, he probably would have
received a probationary sentence. Even before having met my client,
I was struck by the apparent injustice of his situation, and I
proceeded on the assumption that the most important thing to do
right away was to get him released from the mental hospital.
When I met Mr. Murphy, he clearly and unequivocally told me he
wanted to be back on the streets and never to have a felony
conviction. He also told me that President Bush had personally
orchestrated his arrest and incarceration and that operatives from the
Republican National Committee had tried to kidnap him and were
now trying to have him killed. As he continued to explain his story, it
became clear that Mr. Murphy was severely mentally ill and that his
understanding about what was happening to him had absolutely no
basis in reality.
Shortly after that visit with Mr. Murphy, I was able to persuade the
judge to release him. I told the judge that—speaking as Mr.
Murphy’s counsel—I had no concerns with Mr. Murphy proceeding
to trial and that I saw no reason for him to remain incarcerated at the
mental hospital prior to his court date. In truth, the question of
whether he was competent to stand trial was a close call. Mr. Murphy
certainly had a factual understanding of who the various players were
in court and what their roles were. He knew, for example, that I was
the defense attorney and that it was my job to help him. However, he
also thought that I was covertly working for George W. Bush and,
therefore, secretly planning to convict, silence, and ultimately kill
him. He also believed that the government witnesses were receiving
payments from the Republican National Committee in order to
convict him and further claimed firsthand knowledge that the
President had ordered the trial judge to obtain a conviction. As such,
it could certainly be argued that Mr. Murphy lacked a rational
understanding of the case against him.
During the entire course of my representation of Mr. Murphy, his
mental illness (and his lack of a rational understanding of the case)
clouded his thinking. He demanded that I call as character witnesses
various United States Senators, Supreme Court Justices, and White
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187

House staffers. During trial, Mr. Murphy repeatedly told the judge
that I was a part of the conspiracy against him and that he wanted a
new lawyer. Each time, the judge refused.
Throughout most of the pre-trial proceedings, Mr. Murphy wanted
to fire me and to represent himself. For reasons that were never
clear, the judge refused to grant this request and instead told Mr.
Murphy that if he still wanted to represent himself on the day of trial,
188
Until then, however, the judge
he would be allowed to do so.
refused to allow Mr. Murphy to represent himself and refused to
allow me to withdraw as counsel. Although the judge may have been
motivated by a desire to help Mr. Murphy, his ruling had the effect of
placing limitations on Mr. Murphy’s autonomy in an inappropriate
and damaging way. In essence, the judge was denying Mr. Murphy
the dignity of representing himself, instead forcing him to deal with a
189
lawyer he believed to be actively working against him.
Just before trial, Mr. Murphy decided that he wanted me to
represent him, and I pursued a strategy of convincing the jury to
convict him only of the lesser included offense of misdemeanor
attempted possession of a controlled substance, arguing that there
had been no fraudulent conduct. Throughout the trial, Mr. Murphy
publicly and privately railed against the Bushes, the trial judge, me,
the Public Defender Service, and others that he thought were
conspiring to label him a felon and thereby silence him. He never
wavered in his belief that prominent members of the Republican
Party were conspiring behind the scenes to convict him. Surprisingly,

187. After doing some investigation and confirming that none of them had ever
heard of Mr. Murphy, I told him that I would not call them as witnesses.
188. Every criminal defendant has a constitutional right of self-representation, and
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid state and federal governments from
forcing counsel on a defendant who knowingly and voluntarily waives her right to
counsel. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975) (“The Sixth Amendment
does not provide merely that a defense shall be made for the accused; it grants to the
accused personally the right to make his defense.”). But see Indiana v. Edwards, 128
S. Ct. 2379, 2386-87 (2008) (stating that the right to self-representation is not
absolute in that a criminal defendant may be constitutionally competent to proceed
to trial but incompetent to waive counsel).
189. On a more mundane level, Mr. Murphy was unable to subpoena the witnesses
he wanted for trial. When the character witnesses he wanted to call informed my
investigator and me that they did not know Mr. Murphy, I told him that I refused to
call them. Had Mr. Murphy been representing himself, he could have had the
witnesses placed under subpoena himself. See D.C. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P. 17(b)(2)
(allowing defendants not represented by counsel to make ex parte applications for
subpoenas). Because he was represented by counsel, however, Mr. Murphy was
deprived of the right to make that strategic decision. See id. at 17(b)(1) (detailing
the requirements that defense counsel—rather than the defendant—must fulfill in
requesting a subpoena).
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neither the judge nor the prosecutor ever re-visited the issue of Mr.
Murphy’s competency. For strategic reasons, neither did I.
After some colorful testimony from Mr. Murphy and an
unforgettable trial, the jury acquitted him of the felony charges,
finding him guilty of only a single lesser charge, a misdemeanor, for
which he received a sentence of the time that he had already served.
As a result, Mr. Murphy retains his right to vote and remains free
from the stigma of having ever been convicted of a felony.
C. Substitution of Judgment: Reconciling the Choices
Why did I feel equally comfortable raising the issue of competency
in Mr. Sherman’s case (and indeed, arguing strenuously against my
client’s expressed wishes) and not raising my doubts about
190
competency in Mr. Murphy’s case?
The answer, of course, is that
the potential consequences were very different for each client. I
knew that, even if Mr. Murphy were convicted of the felony charges,
he would almost certainly not have received any additional jail time.
In contrast, a conviction in Mr. Sherman’s case would have meant
many years of incarceration. Although there are ways to distinguish
the cases and justify my actions based on the different characteristics
191
of the clients and the different complexities of the cases, such
190. A lack of candor is one thing and affirmatively lying to the court is—or might
be—another. See, e.g., Freedman, supra note 59, at 771 (arguing that lawyers are
permitted—and at times are ethically required—to lie to judges). This view, to say
the least, has proven controversial. Although I find Freedman’s arguments on this
issue persuasive, Mr. Sherman’s situation did not put me in the position of having to
decide whether to apply Freedman’s theory in practice. If the judge asked me
specifically whether I had any doubts about my client’s competency, one approach
would have been to refuse to answer. To do so, of course, would have been
tantamount to an affirmative answer and, I believe, as much a violation of my
obligation to protect confidences and secrets as would an affirmative answer. See id.
at 773 (contending that to remain silent when a judge inquires as to the likelihood of
a client’s guilt, an attorney may lead a judge to infer guilt).
191. Legally, there is no sliding scale of competency that is based on the
seriousness of the case or the potentially serious consequences that may flow from a
conviction. See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 397–98 (1993) (holding that one
uniform standard of competency should be applied to defendants at all phases of the
criminal process). The examples of Mr. Sherman and Mr. Murphy, however,
illustrate why a model of “decisional competency” is a more meaningful construct to
determine whether a defendant is competent to proceed in the case against him.
Mr. Sherman’s situation was significantly more complicated than Mr. Murphy’s, at
the time Mr. Sherman became incompetent. To make an informed, rational
decision, after already admitting guilt, Mr. Sherman had to be able to understand
what it meant to withdraw a guilty plea, the likelihood of success both in convincing
the judge to allow him to withdraw his plea and then in winning the trial, the
potential that he would—if convicted at trial—be sentenced by a judge far more
punitive than the judge he had been assigned, and the ins and outs of what would be
a fairly long and somewhat complicated trial. Because the nature of his charge and
his pre-trial posture were simpler, however, Mr. Murphy had a much simpler decision
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justifications would be disingenuous. The truth is that I believed my
ethical obligation to both clients was informed by the actual likely
consequences of my actions. My relative lack of candor to the court
in Mr. Murphy’s case was justified by the harm that I would have
caused him had I been entirely candid with the court.
In Mr. Murphy’s case, I substituted my judgment for his in many
ways, but not in any of those areas reserved for defendants
themselves. I agreed with Mr. Murphy’s decisions to reject the
government’s plea offer and to demand a jury trial. On the other
hand, I strongly disagreed with his decision to testify. Mr. Murphy
insisted on calling as character witnesses many nationally prominent
Democratic politicians who he claimed would vouch for him. After I
investigated his claims and none of these figures claimed to know
anything about Mr. Murphy, he still insisted that I call them as
witnesses and ask them under oath if they were friends of Mr.
Murphy. When I explained to him that this approach would be
counter-productive and I refused to do it, Mr. Murphy took that as
proof that I was a member of the conspiracy against him.
Throughout the time that I represented him, Mr. Murphy
consistently lacked a rational understanding of the charges against
him, in my opinion. Just as Mr. Sherman’s inability to give rational
reasons for his decisions rendered him incompetent to withdraw his
plea, Mr. Murphy’s inability to give rational explanations for why he
was being prosecuted probably rendered him incompetent to stand
trial and unable to assist his counsel in any meaningful way. I
believed throughout the time that I represented Mr. Murphy that his
understanding of the charges against him, although factually correct,
was irrational. Because of his delusions, he was also utterly unable to
assist me in preparing his defense. Under the ABA’s Criminal Justice
Mental Health Standards, therefore, I should have informed the
Court not only of my belief that Mr. Murphy may be incompetent,
but also of those facts that led me to question Mr. Murphy’s
192
competency. This requirement would presumably include facts and

to make. It is possible to argue, then, that a criminal defendant facing serious and
complex charges must possess a greater degree of rational understanding than a
defendant facing a simple charge. For this logical reason, a sliding scale of
decisional competency for criminal defendants based on the nature of the
allegations against them would serve the values of dignity and autonomy far more
than the simplistic unitary standard endorsed by Godinez.
192. Interestingly, Slobogin and Mashburn also take the position that I should
have been required to disclose my doubts about Mr. Murphy’s competency to the
trial judge. See Slobogin & Mashburn, supra note 109, at 1622 (arguing that defense
attorneys should be ethically bound to inform the court of possible incompetency
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beliefs that Mr. Murphy had told me in confidence during the course
of my representation of him.
The example of Mr. Murphy demonstrates why the approach
endorsed in the ABA’s Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards is
unworkable and incompatible with the criminal defense lawyer’s duty
of zealous representation. It is as dramatically demonstrated every
day when mentally impaired people are charged with misdemeanors,
for which little or no jail time would be imposed even in the event of
a conviction. A lawyer should not be required to take action that
affirmatively hurts her client. Were I to bring up my doubts about
Mr. Murphy’s competency, the result would have been a swift return
to the locked ward at the mental hospital for an indeterminate and
193
The duties of zealous representation and
potentially endless stay.
protection of client confidences should trump any rule that requires
a criminal defense lawyer to raise her doubts about her client’s
competency, without regard to the consequences of such action.
V. TOWARD A MORE MEANINGFUL ETHICAL FRAMEWORK
Its limitations notwithstanding, the Dusky test remains the federal
constitutional standard, and there is no indication that courts are
likely to revisit the issue and institute a more meaningful or useful
194
How, then, does a criminal defense lawyer to go about
standard.
based on the primacy of their obligation to seek appropriate medical treatment for
their clients).
193. To be sure, the analysis in Mr. Murphy’s case would be very different if the
criminal justice system provided more meaningful, humane, and palatable mental
health treatment. Because he was an indigent defendant in a crowded urban
jurisdiction, however, his only option within the criminal justice system was what
Rodney Uphoff has called “maximum security . . . with minimum treatment.”
Uphoff, supra note 173, at 71–72; see also Ross, supra note 140, at 1384 (“Were
incompetent clients not routinely institutionalized, my dilemma would have been
lessened. Imagine if a finding of incompetence meant treatment in an outpatient
setting. Instead of being a threat, a finding of incompetence would then be a viable
alternative. If the hospital to which she was sent was a good place to be, . . . that too
would have lessened my dilemma.”).
194. Bruce Winick and Richard Bonnie have engaged in a spirited debate about
changing the law on adjudication of incompetent defendants, and reforming the
legal regime under which competency is evaluated. See, e.g., Bonnie, supra note 106,
at 543 (noting that Winick fails to recognize that the bar against adjudication of
incompetent defendants serves the interests of the defendant and society); Bonnie,
supra note 120, at 444–45 (proposing that judges actively use clinical evaluation to
assess a defendant’s guilty plea, and that third-party representatives of the defendant
involve themselves in the attorney-client relationship to assist in communication and
ensure adequate legal representation); Bruce J. Winick, Reforming Incompetency To
Stand Trial and Plead Guilty: A Restated Proposal and a Response to Professor Bonnie, 85 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 571, 586 (1995) (responding to Bonnie’s criticism by
declaring that the alleged “societal interests” of the incompetency doctrine may be
more theoretical than real); Bruce J. Winick, Incompetency To Stand Trial: An
Assessment of Costs and Benefits, and a Proposal for Reform, 39 RUTGERS L. REV. 243, 245
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evaluating her client about whose competency she has doubts, either
in determining whether to raise the issue of competency against
client wishes, or in evaluating whether (and to what extent) to defer
to her client’s decisions about how to conduct the litigation. In
short, how does the defense lawyer determine how much decisional
power to allocate to her questionably competent client?
I propose that, regardless of the court’s adjudication of a
defendant as competent under the Dusky/Godinez standard, a defense
lawyer should conduct a separate analysis of her client’s decisional
competency. If the client does not possess the ability to make a
rational decision, then the defense lawyer should consider herself
free to engage in surrogate decision-making in the interests of
protecting her client from harm. At least five factors should be
considered: (1) the client’s ability to give rational reasons for the
proposed course of action; (2) the client’s ability to rationally
consider the negative consequences of the proposed action; (3) the
client’s ability to consider alternative courses of action; (4) the
vehemence with which the client holds the preference for the
proposed course of action; and (5) the irreversibility of the proposed
195
Built into these factors and underlying the
course of action.
analysis is the seriousness of the underlying charges against the client.
A lawyer should undertake a consequentialist analysis of the

(1987) (arguing that defendants and defense counsel should be permitted to waive
incompetency status in favor of trial or a guilty plea rather than being bound by the
court’s pre-trial determination). The concern of Winick and Bonnie in this
exchange has been proposing reforms for courts in dealing with putatively
incompetent criminal defendants. By contrast, the focus of this Article is not
primarily systemic reform, but on the ethics of decision-making of the criminal
defense lawyer within the current legal and ethical framework.
195. This test obviously builds on Slobogin and Mashburn’s “basic rationality and
self-regard” model. It also draws on the work of the Fordham Conference Capacity
Working Group (“the Group”), which examined issues of client capacity and
autonomy with the context of older clients. The Group attempted to provide some
needed guidance for the lawyer dealing with a marginally competent or questionably
competent client, and to expand upon Model Rule 1.14. The Group endorsed a
guideline stating that whenever a lawyer questions her client’s capacity for any
specific purpose, the lawyer should, inter alia:
[c]onsider and balance factors including but not limited to the following:
(a) The client’s ability to articulate reasoning behind the decision; (b) The
variability of the client’s state of mind; (c) The client’s ability to appreciate
consequences of the decision; (d) The irreversibility of the decision; (e) The
substantive fairness of the decision; and (f) The consistency of the decision
with lifetime commitments of the client.
Report of Working Group on Client Capacity, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1003, 1007 (1994).
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196

situation, and be guided by a flexible rather than a formalistic
approach.
On a case-by-case and decision-by-decision basis, the defense lawyer
dealing with a questionably competent client should engage in this
analysis and make the determination whether her client is
decisionally competent to make the decision in question. Only if the
lawyer determines that the client is decisionally incompetent should
the lawyer pursue a course of action at odds with the wishes of her
client. In conducting this inquiry, the lawyer should obviously err on
the side of doing what her client wishes, and the lawyer must be
careful not to simply substitute her own values and judgments
197
whenever she disagrees with her client.
The goals of the criminal justice system are not the same as the
goals of the criminal defense attorney. They never have been and
198
they never should be. A criminal defense attorney who lists among
her professional goals “the search for truth” will not (and should not)
last long, either as a matter of ethics or as a matter of practice. The
defense attorney owes loyalty to one person—her client. And in the
same way that the defense attorney cannot principally be concerned
with the system’s “truth-seeking” function, she cannot be concerned
primarily with upholding the integrity of the system. If upholding
the integrity or moral authority of the system happens to coincide
with the interests of her client—or, more precisely, if she can act in
the service of the system without causing harm to her client—then
she should act in her role as an officer of the court. But if doing so
would cause any harm to her client, then her role as officer of the
court must yield to the duty she owes her client. While the criminal

196. See generally Slobogin & Mashburn, supra note 109, at 1616
(“Consequentialism posits that the appropriateness of a lawyer’s advice, decisions
and actions should be judged by their consequences.”).
197. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 24 cmt. c (2000)
(“Lawyers . . . should be careful not to construe as proof of disability a client’s
insistence on a view of the client’s welfare that a lawyer considers unwise or otherwise
at variance with the lawyer’s own views.”).
198. Justice White acknowledged the different, and conflicting, goals of the
defense lawyer and the criminal justice system in his concurring opinion in United
States v. Wade:
If [the criminal defense lawyer] can confuse a witness, even a truthful
one . . . that will be his normal course. . . . [M]ore often than not, defense
counsel will cross-examine a prosecution witness, and impeach him if he can,
even if he thinks the witness is telling the truth, just as he will attempt to
destroy a witness who he thinks is lying. In this respect, as part of our
modified adversary system, and as part of the duty imposed on the most
honorable defense counsel, we countenance or require conduct which in
many instances has little, if any, relation to the search for truth.
388 U.S. 218, 257–58 (1967) (White, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
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justice system must be concerned with protecting the integrity of the
system and the dignity of its participants, the defense attorney must
neither dilute the principle of zeal that is central to her role nor
irreparably harm the “sacred duty” that she owes her client.
To restore zeal to its rightful place among the pantheon of
199
principles for the defense attorney, courts should recognize that
attorneys must be endowed with the discretion to make choices that
serve the interests of their clients, as long as those choices comport
with the applicable law and the binding rules of ethics. Undoubtedly,
those players in the system who do not owe any such duty to a
client—the prosecutor and the judge—should be bound by their
roles to raise the issue of competency whenever they have a goodfaith doubt. But those courts that have uncritically placed a similar
200
obligation on defense attorneys need to consider the irreparable
harm that such a rule inflicts on the attorney-client relationship and
the historic principle of zealous advocacy.
Faced with a conflict between the mandatory duties of loyalty and
zeal to her client, as well as a mandatory duty to protect client
confidences and secrets, on one hand, and the nebulous idea of the
lawyer as an “officer of the court” on the other, the ethical criminal
defense lawyer must resolve the conflict in favor of her client’s
interest. Subordinating the lawyer’s general duties as officer of the
court in this situation is the only meaningful way to give effect to the
values of dignity and autonomy that are the goals of the adversarial
system.
The ABA should amend Standard 7-4.2(c) of its Criminal Justice
Mental Health Standards to allow for more nuanced decision201
202
making by defense lawyers.
Specifically, amended Standard
7-4.2(c) should read as follows (with my proposed changes
underlined and proposed deletions line-stricken):
Defense counsel should move for evaluation of the defendant’s
competence to stand trial whenever the defense counsel has a good

199. Bernstein, supra note 50, at 1165.
200. E.g., In re Fleming, 16 P.3d 610, 617 (Wash. 2001) (en banc) (stating that
defense counsel must raise the issue of client competency).
201. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 24 cmt. d (“A
lawyer may bring the client’s diminished capacity before a tribunal when doing so is
reasonably calculated to advance the client’s objectives or interests as the client
would define them if able to do so rationally.”).
202. Obviously, those jurisdictions that have adopted Standard 7-4.2(c) and
currently impose an obligation on defense lawyers to alert the court to any doubts
about their client’s competency should amend those ethical rules to permit, rather
than require, disclosure. E.g., MINN. R. CRIM. P. 20.01 (requiring defense attorneys
who doubt the competency of their clients to raise this issue with the court).

2008] CANDOR, ZEAL, AND THE SUBSTITUTION OF JUDGMENT

261

faith doubt as to the defendant’s competence, unless doing so
would be contrary to the interests of the defendant. If the client
objects to such a motion being made, counsel may move for
evaluation over the client’s objection, only if defense counsel has a
reasonable belief (a) that doing so would be in the interests of the
client and (b) that the client’s objection is a product of mental
illness or impairment. If defense counsel believes that the client
has a mental illness or impairment that is preventing the client
from making a reasoned decision on this issue, defense counsel
should make such a motion only if doing so would be in the
interests of the client, as the client would define her interests in the
absence of the mental illness or impairment. In any event, If
counsel determines that such motion is in the interests of the
client, counsel should may make known to the court and to the
prosecutor those facts known to counsel which raise the good faith
doubt of competence.

This proposal begs the question: how does the conscientious,
zealous, client-centered defense lawyer determine what her client’s
interests would be in the absence of mental illness or impairment?
To make such a determination, lawyers should be encouraged to
use a model of substituted judgment, but to do so in a way that guides
the discretion of the lawyer. Before raising the issue of client
competency, a defense lawyer should balance the following factors:
203
(1) the likely consequences of a finding of incompetency; (2) the
likelihood of success at trial or benefits of a plea if counsel does not
raise the issue of competency; (3) the tactical or strategic advantages
and disadvantages to having an evidentiary hearing on the issue of
204
competency; (4) the degree of perceived mental impairment;
(5) the seriousness of the charges facing the client; and (6) the
client’s wishes and ability to give reasoned decisions either for raising
or not raising the issue of competency. In addition, counsel in this

203. This factor will obviously vary greatly by jurisdiction. Before raising the issue
of competency, it is imperative that defense know the statutes that govern the
likelihood and the duration of any civil commitment at a mental health facility, as
well as the actual practice of what happens with criminal defendants who have been
adjudicated incompetent. In addition to these consequences, counsel needs to also
consider the potential stigma attached to a finding of incompetency, and the likely
impact of such a finding on her particular client. On the other hand, a finding of
incompetency obviously precludes a criminal conviction.
204. Just as an evidentiary hearing on competency could reveal aspects of the
defense case to the prosecution (psychiatric experts, disclosure of information about
the defendant, etc.), a competency hearing can be a strategic opportunity to learn
about the prosecution’s case and to preserve an early record of the defendant’s
psychiatric problems for possible use as defenses at trial. Additionally, it can provide
an early opportunity to gain the sympathy of the judge who may later preside over a
trial and/or impose sentence. AMSTERDAM, supra note 139, at 314–18.
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situation should be encouraged to consult other lawyers, who can act
as a check on the lawyer simply imposing her own values and beliefs
205
on her client.
A similar framework can and should be employed beyond the issue
of whether or not to raise competency. Whatever the lawyer decides
to do on that issue, most defense lawyers are faced at some point with
a client who had been found competent (or in whose case the issue
of competency has not been raised) but who is unable meaningfully
to assist in the decision-making that attends a criminal case. As in the
case of Mr. Sherman, the mentally impaired client presents a
challenge to a defense lawyer who is trying simultaneously to honor
the principle of client-centered representation and to zealously
advocate for her client. To simply listen to the mental illness neither
honors the autonomy of the client nor advances the true interests of
206
the client.
In the absence of a rule specifically requiring disclosure of a
lawyer’s doubts about her client’s competency to proceed, the
appropriate conclusion for a lawyer or a court to draw is that the
lawyer’s duties of confidentiality and zeal prohibit her from revealing
207
such doubts if they are adverse to her client’s interests. Rule 1.6 of
205. This is the approach taken by the lawyers for John Salvi, who was charged
with murdering two women at a women’s clinic in Brookline, Massachusetts. Salvi’s
lawyers believed that their client was incompetent, but the judge ruled otherwise.
Ross, supra note 140, at 1363 n.83. After having been found competent, Salvi
forbade his lawyers to pursue an insanity defense, which they believed to be his only
viable defense. Id. Salvi’s lawyers assembled a team of experienced defense lawyers
to help them decide how to proceed, and they concluded that they could ethically
raise an insanity defense against their client’s wishes. Id.
206. In many cases involving mentally impaired defendants, it is not at all clear—
even to the diligent, zealous, and conscientious lawyer—which course of action
would “help” her client and which would “hurt” her client. The lawyers for Russell
Weston faced just such an unenviable dilemma. Weston was charged with murdering
two federal police officers and attempting to murder a third at the U.S. Capitol.
Suffering from schizophrenia and driven by severe delusions, Weston forced his way
into the U.S. Capitol and opened fire. The trial judge found Weston incompetent to
stand trial because of his psychosis and schizophrenia. The only possibility of
restoring his competency was anti-psychotic medication.
His lawyers found
themselves having to decide between two courses of action: resisting the antipsychotic medication (which their delusional client was instructing them to do) or
arguing contrary to their client’s wishes in favor of the medication. They were
forced, therefore, to decide between advocating their client’s continued slide into
deeper and deeper mental illness or, on the other hand, forcible medication that
would have led to their client’s execution. For an interesting discussion of the
Weston case and a critique of the trial judge’s refusal to appoint Weston a guardian
ad litem (which his lawyers had requested), see Sarah E. Wolf, The Mentally
Incompetent Criminal Defendant: United States v. Weston and the Need for a Guardian Ad
Litem, 10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1071 (2002).
207. Professor Fortune offers a similar analysis in a slightly different context. See
William H. Fortune, A Proposal To Require Lawyers To Disclose Information About
Procedural Matters, 87 KY. L.J. 1099 (1999) (arguing that in the absence of a rule
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the Model Rules, the more specific provision, should control. In
Rule 1.6, the default position is protection of client confidences, and
208
the exception is candor.
The attempt to create a standard for decision-making (or
substitution of judgment) for mentally impaired clients has led to a
variety of theories. Josephine Ross argues for an “ethic of care”
approach, in which she would “emphasize[] peoples’ interconnection
209
and responsibility rather than their independence and autonomy.”
On the other end of the spectrum would be an “ethic of autonomy”
approach, which would all but preclude a lawyer from substituting
her own judgment for that of the client, regardless of mental
impairment. Additionally, there is what could be described as an
“ethic of integrity” approach, which would focus on the formal right
of a person not to be judged while incompetent (as well as the
societal value in the integrity of the criminal justice process) and
would value the lawyer’s role as an officer of the court over the
lawyer’s role as an advocate for her client.
requiring a defense attorney’s disclosure upon discovering a court’s procedural
error, the duties of confidentiality and zeal require the attorney to remain silent).
208. Rule 1.6 provides:
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a
client unless the client gives informed consent, the disclosure is impliedly
authorized in order to carry out the representation or the disclosure is
permitted by paragraph (b).
(b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a client
to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm;
(2) to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is
reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the financial interests
or property of another and in furtherance of which the client has used
or is using the lawyer’s services;
(3) to prevent, mitigate, or rectify substantial injury to the financial
interests or property of another that is reasonably certain to result or has
resulted from the client’s commission of a crime or fraud in furtherance
of which the client has used the lawyer’s services;
(4) to secure legal advice about the lawyer’s compliance with these
Rules;
(5) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a
controversy between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a
criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in
which the client was involved, or to respond to allegations in any
proceeding concerning the lawyer’s representation of the client; or
(6) to comply with other law or a court order.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2002). The broad duty of confidentiality is
premised upon a belief that “the public interest is usually best served by a strict rule
requiring lawyers to preserve the confidentiality of information relating to the
representation of their clients,” id. at 1.6 cmt. 6, and that a strict rule of
confidentiality will encourage people “to seek legal assistance and to communicate
fully and frankly with the lawyer even as to embarrassing or legally damaging subject
matter,” id. at 1.6 cmt. 4.
209. Ross, supra note 140, at 1372.
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None of these approaches alone captures the nuance and difficulty
of a criminal defense lawyer trying to figure out how to best represent
a mentally impaired client. The approaches that focus on the
integrity of the system or on an abstract right of an individual not to
undergo any sort of court proceeding while incompetent lead to a
system in which the lawyer acts as a judge of her client and is required
to subordinate her role as advocate to that of a guardian of the
system. Moreover, it requires the defense lawyer to take actions that
would affirmatively cause harm to her client, including potentially
indefinite confinement in a mental hospital for even very minor
charges. The “ethic of care” approach comes closer to an acceptable,
client-centered model of lawyer decision-making for mentally
impaired clients. Its paternalistic bent, however, assumes a complete
substitution of judgment in which the lawyer acts as a concerned
parent might act, rather than as the client would act if competent,
lucid, and rational. Although these approaches are overlapping and
interconnected, I propose that the conscientious defense lawyer
should attempt not to do necessarily what is “best” for the mentally
impaired client, but attempt to discern what the client’s wishes would
be absent the mental impairment that prevents the client from
making a rational decision.
This approach could include
consultations not only with the client but also with family members
210
Such an approach
and others who are close with the defendant.
may be cumbersome and is certainly easier in theory than in practice.
It has, however, the virtues of imposing some sort of check on the
discretion of the defense lawyer and of honoring the true autonomy
of the client.
CONCLUSION
We return to the fundamental principle: a lawyer should do no
211
harm to her client. Although there are situations in which a lawyer

210. Obviously, one of the complications with this approach arises from the
lawyer’s need to protect client confidences. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R.
1.6 (prohibiting an attorney from revealing information relating to the client’s
representation except in certain scenarios, such as when the client gives informed
consent).
211. It is a widely held misconception that the phrase “first, do no harm”
originated in the Hippocratic Oath. In fact, those words do not appear in the
Hippocratic Oath and never have. In his book Epidemics, Hippocrates gave the
following advice: “As to diseases, make a habit of two things: to help, or at least to
do no harm.” HIPPOCRATES, EPIDEMICS, BOOK I 165 (W. H. S. Jones trans., Harvard
Univ. Press 1957).
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212

is compelled to do just that, those situations are extremely rare, and
even then, the lawyer is duty-bound to proceed in a manner that
causes as little harm as possible, consistent with the laws and the rules
of ethics.
One of the most frequently offered justifications for a rule
requiring attorneys to disclose any doubts about the competency of a
213
client is a defense of the integrity of the system. A legal system that
tolerates even the possibility of putting an incompetent defendant on
trial, the argument goes, is necessarily an illegitimate system
unworthy of respect. The argument, however, is not so neat, and not
so clearly on the side of mandating disclosure. The dignity of a
system that uses the attorney-client relationship to potentially consign
mentally impaired criminal defendants to months or even years of
pre-trial institutionalization solely by reason of their impairment is
very much in question. A marginally competent (or incompetent)
defendant whose lawyer reveals to the court and opposing counsel
her doubts about her client’s competency and the reasons for those
doubts would certainly agree with this assertion. As Monroe
Freedman has argued, “Before we will permit the state to deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, we require that certain processes
which ensure regard for the dignity of the individual be followed,
214
The
irrespective of their impact on the determination of truth.”
relevant question, then, in the context of potentially incompetent
criminal defendants, is not whether the system should contain
protections for the dignity of those individuals, but which rule would
more effectively serve that purpose.
The unique nature of the attorney-client relationship is the aspect
of the criminal justice system that most effectively protects the dignity
215
of the individual and, necessarily, the moral authority of the system.
An adversarial system in which the attorney-client relationship is as
close to sacrosanct as possible, and in which the attorney is
empowered to advocate for her client as aggressively as possible, is
the best way to ensure that the accused’s dignity interests are
protected in a meaningful, rather than purely a theoretical or
212. In some situations, a lawyer may well feel justified in causing harm to her
client. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(2) (“A lawyer may reveal
information relating to the representation of a client . . . to prevent the client from
committing a crime . . . .”).
213. See Bonnie, supra note 120, at 426–28 (identifying dignity, reliability, and
autonomy as three reasons the system does not tolerate forcing the incompetent
accused to trial).
214. Monroe H. Freedman, Judge Frankel’s Search for Truth, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1060,
1065 (1975).
215. FREEDMAN & SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS, supra note 40, at 2–8.
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216

Overemphasis on the lawyer’s duty of candor
formalistic, sense.
217
toward the tribunal creates an “affirmative duty of betrayal” and
destroys many of the values and protections that the American
criminal justice system values. Allowing the defense lawyer to fulfill
her role as zealous advocate, and necessarily subordinating to that
principle any obligation as an officer of the court, upholds the dignity
of the system more than a regime of mandatory disclosure or strict
candor. Although a system that endows a defense lawyer with the
discretion to substitute her judgment for that of her mentally
impaired client has perils of its own, such substitution is the only way,
when representing certain mentally impaired criminal defendants, to
meaningfully vindicate the ideals of zeal and dignity that should
define the practice of criminal defense.

216. Id.
217. H. Richard Uviller, The Advocate, the Truth, and Judicial Hackles: A Reaction to
Judge Frankel’s Idea, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1067, 1073–74 (1975).

